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POWER OF COURT TO ORDER BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE NoN-PATERNITY
THE outcome of a number of legal controversies ultimately depends on a deter-
mination of who are the parents of a particular child.1  Yet the facts upon which
such a determination may be made are peculiarly within the knowledge of the real
parents and may be a mystery even to them. Consequently it has often been
necessary for the courts to treat as competent such amusingly inaccurate evidence
as profert of the child to the jury as "exhibit A" to show its resemblance to the
putative father; 2 the mother's curses called down upon the alleged father during
her labor pains; 3 and mathematical calculations of the period of gestation 4 that
are sufficiently complicated to confound any jury and that are dependent for accu-
racy upon a finding of fact that at a certain time only a particular person could
have had the necessary relation with the mother. Proof of this latter fact is
fanciful at best.
In direct contrast to these uncertain attempts, the possibility of determining
parentage by means of the Landsteiner blood tests is now definitely recognized by
modem science.5 Since discovery of the tests by Landsteiner in 1901,0 knowledge
of their accuracy and utility has gradually increased. Their efficacy is due to the
fact that every individual's blood falls into one of four classes, and that a given
pair of adults can produce only children of certain definite blood groups. Applica-
tion of the tests to problems of heredity 7 has shown that where it is possible to
obtain samples of the blood of both adults and the child concerned in the dispute,
conclusive evidence against parentage can be obtained at least one third of the time. 8
Thus it is possible to replace in part the uncertain legal methods of determining
parentage with real and irrefutable scientific evidence. But, because of the failure
of blood tests to furnish definite proof more than one third of the time, it may
be questionable whether they should be used in connection with a legal trial. In
the event that a test showed non-paternity, the test would be final and would obviato
any need for further inquiry. And where a test failed to show non-paternity, which
would happen two thirds of the time, it would indicate merely that the Landsteiner
1. Such controversies include civil actions for damages for carnal assault, bastardy
proceedings, probate proceedings, and criminal prosecutions for rape and seduction.
2. See Commonwealth v. Pearl, 33 Pa. Sup. Ct. 97, 99 (1907); Narrell v. State, 117
So. 609 (Ala. 1928).
3. See Commonwealth v. Losey, 79 Pa. Sup. Ct. 75, 80 (1922) (provided the mother's
curse tends to identify the defendant).
4. See State v. Ferguson, 157 Wash. 19, 22, 288 Pac. 239, 240 (1930).
5. For a discussion of the medical aspects of the Landsteiner tests and of their admll-
bility in evidence, see Lee, Blood Tests for Paternity (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 441, and
articles there cited; comment (1934) 32 McH. L. REv. 987; Note (1934) 43 YALn L. 3.
651.
6. (1930) 72 ScIENCn (N.S.), supp. X.
7. Through the von Dungern and Hirszfeld and also the Bernstein theories of heredity
of blood groups. See Voge and Moore, The Human Blood Groups (1929) 21 Euonlics
REv. 197.
8. See 32 Mc. L. REv.; 43 YALE L. J., both supra note 5. Estimates of the chances
of proving non-paternity by the tests vary greatly depending upon the particular theory
on which they are based.
tests cannot successfully be used on the particular individuals and not that paternity
is an established or more probable fact. However, since a legal trial must ensue,
there is danger that the failure of the test to show non-paternity may be taken
by a jury to indicate a greater probability of paternity, which would unwarrantedly
reduce the freedom of the jury's decision.0 Yet the possibility of confusion for
this reason alone need not in fact be a source of prejudice if the jury is either
ignorant of the test's use, or if it is made sufficiently clear to them that failure of
the test may be due to circumstances other than paternity in the given instance.
Thus the utility of the Landsteiner tests would be to dispense with a trial in one
third of the cases, leaving the others to their ordinary legal procedure.
Yet despite this advantage American courts, in contrast to numerous foreign
courts,10 have hesitated to accept the competency of the tests to settle a disputed
question of parentage. A few courts have upheld them as adequate, 1 while others
have refused to accept them until further proof of their accuracy is forthcoming. '
A recent New York case brought the question to the fore in a new aspect, when
the defendant in a suit for damages for carnal assault moved the trial court to
compel the plaintiff and his alleged child to submit to blood tests, which he claimed
would establish his innocence. From an order granting the motion the plaintiff
appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, which reversed the order
on the grounds that the test would not be enlightening with regard to the mother,
and that as to the child no authority existed to issue the order, since it welfare was
in no way involved.' 3  As it is only natural that a litigant knowing of his or her
status as a parent might prefer the uncertainties of a jury trial to the scientific
accuracy of blood examinations, some power in the court is essential to compel
such a party to submit to an examination against his or her will. Therefore the
future utility of the Landsteiner tests in deciding judicial questions of parentage may
depend not only upon their acceptance as competent evidence but also upon the
power of the courts to compel their use.
In the New York case the lower court 4 based such power on a statute granting
to courts presiding over civil actions authority to order a physical examination of
the plaintiff on motion of the defendant.'0 In the absence of such a statute many
courts have assumed an inherent power to require a physical examination of the
plaintiff upon the motion of the defendant.'0 In so doing the courts of law were
9. Appeal courts have often emphasized that trial judges should take no action which
would unwarrantedly prejudice one of the parties in the eyes of the jury. See, e.g.
Washington v. Washington, 145 Ga. 814, 90 S. E. 43 (1916); Townend v. City of Joplin,
139 Mo. App. 394, 403 (1909).
10. See Lee, supra note 5, at 443, n. 21. In England blood tests are now considced
competent evidence. See (1934) 9S Jus'. P. 355.
11. Commonwealth v. Zamorelli, 17 D. & C. 229 (1931); Beuschel v. Manowitz, 151 Misc.
899, 271 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
12. State v. Damm, 252 N. W. 7 (S. D. 1933).
13. Beuschel v. ]anowitz, 241 App. Div. 888, 272 N. Y. Supp. 165 (2d Dap't, 1934).
14. Beuschel v. Manowitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
15. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (Gilbert-Bliss, 1926) § 306. See also, Anz. Rzv. CoDn Am.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4468; N. J. Comp. STAT. (1911) p. 2226, § 19; S. D. Co'jm. Lw.s
(1929) § 2716-A (including X-ray examinations); WAsHz. Rmv. STAT. Ai.:z (Remington,
1932) § 1230-1. The court in H3ayt v. Brewster-Gordon and Co., 199 App. Div. 63, 191
N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't, 1921), definitely extended such physical examination rtatuts
to include blood tests.
16. City of Ottawa v. Galliland, 63 Kan. 165, 65 Pac. 252 (1901); Brown v. Hutzler
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merely following what the Chancery courts had long done before them.17 It is the
natural result of an attitude on the part of the courts that the object of a judicial
trial is the administration of full justice between the litigants,18 which is frequently
said to demand an accurate disclosure of the whole truth.10 If the defendant is
not to be left wholly at the mercy of plaintiff's witnesses, 20 the court must possess
some authority to control those "who seek for their own fraud the very aid of the
law itself." 2 1  As this line of reasoning has proved so persuasive with the courts in
extracting by physical examination evidence of the nature and extent of an injury,
it should prove even more so where real evidence as to the actual commission of
an injury is possibly obtainable by means of blood tests. The judicial function of
the latter is likewise to bring to light the hidden truth in the plaintiff's possession
and so afford a more nearly perfect administration of justice.22 Nor can there
be any valid objection that blood tests are novel or dangerous in view of the per-
fection achieved in their use by modem science and the court's authority to
require -every necessary safeguard for the benefit of the person examined.22
The court's power to compel physical examinations, however, has been exercised
only where the defendant has made the proper motion.23 Upon such motion the
court merely uses its discretion to determine whether the right of the defendant
under the best evidence rule to any disclosure necessary to a proper administration
of justice entitles him to an exercise of the court's authority.24 A curious incon-
sistency is disclosed by this attitude on the part of the courts. Conceptually a court
is a mere referee of the legal contest waged before it. Yet its power to compel
examination is based on the premise that justice can thereby be served. The result
is an attitude to the effect that the court will exercise any power necessary to further
the ends of justice and truth, provided that the litigants have sufficient acumen to
ask for it. If justice is really as important as it is sometimes said to be, the courts
should have power to order upon their own motion physical examinations or blood
tests of the parties whenever necessary to elicit the true facts. The desirability
Bros. Co., 152 M'd. 39, 136 AUt. 30, 51 A. L. R. 177 (1927); Graves v. City of Battle
Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 54 N. W. 757 (1893); see 4 IGmoRE, EvmmEcE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 2220; 1 Thoi IsoN, TRIALs (2d ed. 1912) § 859. Contra: Union Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1891). Obviously there is no necessity for such assumption
of authority over the defendant in civil actions since he is not the injured party. Similarly
the possibilities inherent in the Landsteiner tests are so restricted as to make It unlikely
that a plaintiff will ever demand their use.
17. 4 XVIGMoRE § 2217; id. at § 2220, n. 13.
18. See Hess v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Rr. Co., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 565, 966
(1890).
19. See Schroeder v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rr. Co., 47 Iowa 375, 379 (1877);
McGovern v. Hope, 63 N. J. 76, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
20. See Cook v. Miller, 103 Conn. 267, 272, 130 Atl. 571, 573 (1925); Wanek v.
Winona, 78 Minn. 98, 100, 80 N. W. 851 (1899).
21. See 4 WIcuoRE § 2220.
22. Hayt v. Brewster-Gordon and Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th
Dep't, 1921).
23. See City of Ottawa v. Galliland; Graves v. City of Battle Creek; Brown v.
Hutzler Bros. Co., all supra note 16.
24. Sibley v. Smith, 46 Ark. 275 (1885); Schroeder v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Rr. Co., 47 Iowa 375 (1877); City of Freeport v. Isbell, 93 Ill. 381 (1879); McGovern
v. Hope, 63 N. J. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1899). But see Atkinson v. United Rys. Co., 286 Mo. 634,
641, 228 S. W. 483, 485 (1921).
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of reaching a complete solution of a case is just as great when both parties wish
to conceal the actual facts as when only one of them does. Considerations of
justice have often been deemed sufficient to justify courts upon their own motion
and against the will of both parties in summoning witnesses in an effort to obtain
more reliable evidence of the true facts of a case.25 Thus when a proper adminis-
tration of justice makes it necessary, the court has the right and even the duty to
exercise inquisitorial powers impartially and without prejudice.
The same reasons do not necessarily include within the court's power an examina-
tion of the child's blood. Reasons for the court's assuming authority over the child
are nevertheless real. Technically it is not a party to the suit nor is its welfare
directly involved. The damages awarded to the mother in civil proceedings are for
suffering and injury incurred as a result of the carnal assault.20 Yet since a mother
is usually held to be under a legal duty to support her bastard child if the latter
is in her custody,2 7 the benefit accruing to the child from the mother's enrichment
might be said so to inject the child's welfare into the suit as to afford the court
ample grounds for assuming authority over it. Similarly because of the child's inter-
est in the granting of alimony the courts have not hesitated to adjudicate its in-
terests in divorce proceedings between the parents.28  Obviously no such basis exists
if the child is in the custody of the alleged father, for in such case judgment for
the mother could be only a detriment to the child's welfare.
In such circumstances, however, it is possible to regard the child as a witness sub-
ject to the testimonial duty, "which includes every form of disclosure that may
assist in the ascertainment of the truth."29 As regards the performance of the
testimonial duty, the distinction between a party and a witness is slight. At common
law the testimonial privilege of a party to a suit was more difficult to overcome than
that of a witness.& 0 In view of the extent to which courts have gone in compelling
parties to controversies to submit to various types of examinations, it would indeed
be astonishing should the courts refuse to exercise the same authority over such
an important witness as the child in the instant case. It is significant that in criminal
prosecutions for rape of females under age the courts have often subjected the
prosecuting witness to embarrassing medical examinations by experts on motion
of the defendant. Z' In the instant case no valid objection can be made that the
child is too young to be competent as a witness, since for the purpose of the blood
tests the age of the child makes no difference. Since some reasonable basis is thus
found to exist for the court's authority to require tests of the blood of all three
25. Townsend v. City of Joplin, 139 Mo. App. 394, 123 S. W. 474 (1909). AIo
Kamaholo v. Coelho, 24 Haw. 689 (1919); Sheets v. Bray, 125 Ind. 33, 24 N. E. 357
(1890) (parties themseves called as witnesses by the court); State v. Home, 171 N. C.
787, 88 S. E. 433 (1916); efrchant's Bank v. Goodfellow, 44 Utah 349, 140 Pac. 759
(1914); Note (1929) 42 HARv. L. Rnv. 445; (1928) 27 MicH. L. REv. 354; (1930) 15
lm-Nr. L. RLv. 350; 57 L. R. A. 875 (1902); 1916A L. R. A. 1191.
26. See Gemmill v. Brown, 25 Ind. App. 6, 16, 56 N. E. 691, 695 (1900); Kreighbaum
v. Dinsmore, 88 Ind. App. 693, 699, 165 N. E. 526, 528 (1929).
27. People v. Green, 19 Cal. App. 109, 124 Pac. 871 (1912) (by statute); In re
Vieweger, 93 N. J. Eq. 527, 117 AUt. 291 (Ch. 1922). But see State v. Tieman, 32 Wash.
294, 73 Pac. 375 (1903).
28. Kell v. Kell, 179 Iowa 647, 161 N. W. 634 (1917); Laumeier v. Launder, 303
Mo. 201, 271 S. W. 481 (1925); see Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933).
29. 4 WmmaoRE §§ 2194, 2216(7).
30. 4 Wmroam § 2217(8).
31. Walker v. State, 12 Old. Cr. 179, 153 Pac. 209 (1915); see 4 Wxzmoir § 2216, n. 4.
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persons necessary to the success of the Landsteiner tests, sound reason and impartial
justice would seem to recommend that the courts keep pace with the progress of
modem science by discarding fruitless and outmoded theoretical principles in favor
of every opportunity afforded by science to decide each case fairly upon its real facts.
DETERMINATION OF BANK INSOLVENCY IN SUIT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST BY PARTY
DEPOSITING AFTER ALLEGED INSOLVENCY
THE recent debacle of bank failures' has emphasized more than ever the difficulty
confronting courts in the application of proper standards by which to determine
precisely at what time a bank becomes insolvent.2 The issue is clearly presented when
the remedy of a constructive trust is sought for the benefit of a person depositing
money after the alleged insolvency occurs. Since recognition of such a preference
means a lessening of funds ultimately available to the common depositor,3 the situ-
ation necessarily involves to some extent a balancing of the interests of the mass
of depositors against those of the individual seeking a preference; and in close cases
the definition of insolvency actually employed by the court may well be the deter.
minative factor. In a recent West Virginia decision such an opportunity for defini-
tional selection was presented. 4 The plaintiff made deposits in the defendant bank
at various times during a period from December 22, 1930 to December 31, 1930,
on which latter day the bank closed its doors. Subsequently an action was instituted
against the receiver to impress a trust for the amount deposited after insolvency,
which was alleged to have occurred on December 22nd.5 According to the bank's
own financial statement there was on that date an excess of assets over liabilities,(
but the bank commissioner's figures showed a five per cent deficiency, based on an
evaluation made during the nine-day period.7 No direct evidence was presented
to show that the bank was not in fact meeting its daily obligations during the period
1. During the period from 1921 to 1933, the number of banks in the United States
was reduced by one half. The failures involved 10% of all the banks in operation on
June 30, 1931, and 3y49% of all the deposits of all active banks of that date. WILLig
AND CHgAPm N, THE BANKING SIrTUATION (1934) 297.
2. The comment of the court in Chandler v. Abney, 166 S. C. 523, 528, 165 S. E.
190, 191-192 (1932) is pertinent: "Who has known, anyhow, for the past several years
when a bank was solvent or insolvent? Most of us have even quit guessing. A bank
may be solvent today and insolvent tomorrow. Not only a few days but a few hours
may spell the difference between solvency and insolvency. We may suspect insolvency,
but we dare not tell our suspicions to our friends, for fear of landing in jail . . . All
that we can do is trust to luck and try to go on sleepingl"
3. See Garrett v. Tunnidliffe, 107 Fla. 393, 398, 145 So. 213, 215 (1932); Comment
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 432.
4. Ream's Drug Store v. Bank of Monongahela Valley, 174 S. E. 788 (W. Va. 1934).
5. On this day the deputy bank commissioner secretly requested the written resignations
of the bank officials. Record in Ream's Drug Store v'. Bank of Monongahela Valley, 174
S. E. 788 (W. Va. 1934), 314-315. This action, the deputy commissioner testified, was
in accordance with a plan by which a private banker was to take over the bank on the
condition that full control be given him. Record, at 315. Iowever, the resignations
were never accepted by the bank.
6. Record, supra note 5, at 157a.
7. Record, supra note 5, at 263-265, 297. According to his appraisal the bank was
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in question s but it was found as a fact that the bank on December 22nd was "hope-
lessly insolvent" to the knowledge of its officials. The court accordingly granted
a recovery.9
If the fact of insolvency is beyond dispute, and such fact was known to the man-
agement, then a constructive trust may ordinarily be impressed for the benefit of
an innocent party depositing before the bank actually doses its doors; and if the
sum deposited can be considered as "augmenting" the assets and can be "traced"
into the hands of the receiver, then it can be recovered from the receiver in full
before payments are made to the rank and file of depositors and creditors.10 The
underlying fraud or wrong on which this constructive trust is based apparently con-
sists of the act of receiving deposits when the bank officials knew that insolvency
was so hopeless that the bank could not repay the money."1 Recovery in this situ-
tion, however, is usually made to depend upon proof of a number of factors, namely,
that the bank was insolvent, that such insolvency was hopeless, and that the officers
carrying its assets at an excess valuation of $400,000. Another appraisal was made as
of March 31, 1931 which showed the loss in assets to be approximately 1615,00. Record,
at 266, 267.
8. Federal Reserve Bank checks, which in the ordinary course of business would have
been remitted on December 31st, were not paid on that day. Record, supra note 5, at
62-63. There apparently was no evidence that the other current obligations were not
met in the due course of business. Brief for Appellant, 94-95. The lower court's basis
for determining insolvency seemed to be simply whether the assets exceeded the liabilitie.
Record, at 497-498.
9. In its opinion the West Virginia Supreme Court relied to a considerable extent on
the fact that the bank had borrowed heavily on its own credits, and had also received
large deposits from the state within the last skv months of the bank's existence. The
court said that, although the bank was meeting its current checking account withdrwal,
it was only through application of state funds, and that consequently they had not bz-n
met in the usual course of business. Due to the state's prior lien, the plaintiffs ultimately
took nothing in this suit.
10. St. Augustine Paint Co. v. McNair, 59 F. (2d) 755 (S. D. Fla. 1932); 2 foaS-,
BAwxs As'm B -sKruo (6th ed. 1928) § 629; see Scott, The Right to Follow 11oney
Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money (1913) 27 KuRv. L. RPv. 125; Note (1928) 37
Y=u~u L. J. 1150. As to recovery of collection items see Townsend, Constructire Trusts
and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YAr.n L. J. 9S0. While it is clear that a deposit of cash
is a sufficient augmentation to come within the rule, there is considerable conflUct as to
whether the deposit of a check drawn on the insolvent bank can be so considered. Many
decisions have held it to be an augmentation. Leach v. Bank, 204 Iowa 1033, 216 N. W.
748 (1927); Wimkler v. Veigle, 176 Mfinn. 384, 223 N. W. 622 (1929); Northwest Lumbzr
Co. v. Bank, 130 Wash. 33, 225 Pac. S25 (1924). Contra: Bechanics' Bank v. Buchanan,
12 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Rorebeck v. Benedict Co., 26 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928). See generally Covitt, The Legal Effect of Insolvency on Bank Deposis, (1933)
81 U. or PA. L. REv. 390, 406; Comment (1932) 41 YA=E L. J. 432; Note (1930) 39
YALr. L. J. 576. Specific identification of the pieces of money composing the trust res
was at one time held requisite, but this was later modified. Townsend, sura at 931.
Although the courts still pay lip-service to the strict rule that identification of the res
is necessary, this has been relaxed by various fictitious presumptions in most state , some
even dispensing with the need of a res and tracing altogether. See Comment (1934) 43
YALE L. J. 794, 803-805. See generally Townsend, Tracing Technique in Bank Preference
Cases (1933) 7 U. or CL. L. Rnv. 201.
11. Actual intent to defraud is unnecessary. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Johnston, 133
U. S. 566 (1890); Covitt, supra note 10, at 395. The declaration of a constructive trust
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had knowledge of the hopelessness.12 Hopeless insolvency, as distinguished from
that technically designated as "simple" insolvency upon which alone no recovery
would be granted,13 is clearly established by showing that the officers knew at the
time the money was deposited that the bank would not and could not return it.1
4
Hindsight is occasionally used to aid in the determination not only of the insolvency,
but also of this latter essential. 15  That this is unfortunate seems apparent, since
what might clearly appear to have been a "hopeless" situation judged from the
vantage point of 1934 might well have seemed considerably less critical to the
officers involved in the events when they actually happened.
The existence of fraud in cases of this sort has misled the courts into acting as
though they were dealing with the ordinary situation in which the device of the
constructive trust is employed, namely, where it is desirable to force a wrongdoer
to surrender property which in equity he should not be allowed to keep. But in
bank insolvency cases to allow this remedy takes money not from the wrongdoer,
the bank, but from the innocent creditors, the other depositors.'( The justice of
granting constructive trusts in situations of this sort should not, therefore, be de-
termined without an inquiry as to whether the other depositors were enriched as a
result of the fraud. Such an inquiry reveals that, even if the fraudulently obtained
deposit were not "dissipated" in the legal sense, the presence in the bank of these
predicates the passage of title in the funds from depositor to bank. Some courts have
held that, although the deposit created a contract between the depositor and the bank,
this contract may be rescinded since induced by fraud. Steele v. Commissioner of Banks,
240 Mass. 394, 134 N. E. 401 (1922). However, others allow a recovery in such a
situation on the ground that the fraud prevented title in the deposit from ever pass1ng
to the bank. Federal Reserve Bank v. Idaho Ass'n, 8 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925),
cert. denied 270 U. S. 646 (1926).
12. E. g., Forsythe v. Bank, 185 Minn. 255, 241 N. W. 66 (1932).
13. Bank v. Yaffey, 102 Fla. 723, 136 So. 399 (1931); Forsythe v. Bank, 185 Minn.
255, 241 N. W. 66 (1932); 2 MoRsE, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 629.
14. Steele v. Commissioner of Banks, 240 Mass. 394, 134 1T. E. 401 (1922); Forsythe
v. Bank, 185 Minn. 255, 241 N. W. 66 (1932). There must be proof that the officers
knew of the bank's condition. Williams v. Cox, 97 Tenn. 555, 37 S. W. 282 (1896).
And the burden of proof is upon the depositor. Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (C. C. E. D.
Pa. 1899). Although honest mistake and belief that the bank is solvent negatives fraud,
some courts require the belief to be reasonably founded. Bank v. Yaffey, 102 Fla, 723,
136 So. 399 (1931). It is generally held that if the officials, although having knowledge
of the insolvency, yet had honest and reasonable expectations that the bank would be
able to continue business, there is no hopeless insolvency. Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201
Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Forsythe v. Bank, supra; Steele v. Commissioner, supra;
Washington Shoe Co. v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 218 Pac. 232 (1923) (hope of congolida-
tion); Beehive Marketeria v. Bank, 126 Wash. 526, 218 Pac. 237 (1923). Most courts
seem to apply an objective standard of reasonableness to test the official's hopes. St.
Augustine Co. v. McNair, 59 F. (2d) 755, 756 (S. D. Fla. 1932); Steele v. Commissioner
of Banks, supra. A mere promise of aid from an outside source, without more, Is In-
sufficient. Rochester Co. v. Loomis, 45 Hun. 93 (N. Y. 1887); 2 MoRsE, op. cit. sutpra
note 10, at § 629a; Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 630.
15. Federal Reserve Bank v. Idaho Ass'n, 8 F. (2d) 922, 927, (C, C, A. 9th, 1925),
cert. denied 270 U. S. 646 (1926); Ream's Drug Store v. Bank of Monongahela Valley,
174 S. E. 788, 792 (W. Va. 1934).
16. Leach v. Bank, 204 Iowa 497, 508, 215 N. W. 728, 730 (1927); Townsend, supra
note 10, 7 U. oF Cn;. L. Rev., at 207.
additional assets might have induced it either to embark on new and unwise loans
or to pay existing debts that would not otherwise have been paid, creditors of such
debts thereby being paid in full instead of receiving only a proportionate share from
the insolvent estate. But as a practical matter, it is usually impossible to tell
whether or not the presence in the bank of the fraudulently obtained deposits in-
duced the management to make any particular loans or pay any particular debts
that would not otherwise have been made or paid. And if it were not shown that
such loans or debts were not made or paid, it would seem preferable to presume
that no enrichment to the general depositors and creditors resulted, and hence to
deny the constructive trust. For the depositor seeking a preference in this manner
has actually done nothing more to merit it than other depositors who have no basis
for such a claim. The actual time of his deposit, with respect to the insolvency,
is purely accidental; in addition, the person who made a deposit before insolvency
and failed to draw it out after insolvency, but before the bank shut its doors, cannot
be said to be more careless and more deserving of loss than he who made a new
deposit after insolvency. Furthermore, imposing a trust on liquidation is no de-
terrent to fraudulent or inefficient management by banking officials, nor does it
even remotely aid in safeguarding the interests of depositors generally. Denying
the claimant a recovery, however, amounts only to compelling him to undertake
the risk of insolvency which confronted all depositors. Moreover, to refuse a re-
covery would not necessarily preclude any remedy, since in many jurisdictions the
claimant may still enforce civil liability for his loss against the bank officials for
fraud and deceit,' 7 in accepting deposits while knowing of insolvency. The other
creditors would have no such cause of action.
If the courts are unwilling to take the radical step of denying all constructive
trusts in situations of this sort, the number of preferences granted could at least
be restricted by adopting a definition of insolvency which places the date of in-
solvency as close as possible to the date when the doors of the bank are closed.
There are at present three definitions of insolvency employed in bank preference
cases. The most usual definition, that applied as well in actions to impose criminal
liability on bank directors, 8 is whether the bank was able to meet its obligations
in the ordinary course of business.' 9 A liberal modification of this test appears in some
17. When the directors are considered as being in a trustee relationship to the depositors,
they are liable in fraud for losses resulting from a non-observance of care and diligence
in permitting an insolvent bank to receive deposits. Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N. Y. S05,
63 N. E. 554 (1902); 1 AMlicE, B s AN r B. .m=G (1931) § 155. Civil liability against
the officials may be secured under statutes in many states. Comment (1934) 43 Y.A
L. J. 1304, 1306 n.12. Some states impose a civil liability superimposed on the criminal
liability. Ellett v. Newland, 171 La. 1019, 1023, 132 So. 761, 762 (1931).
18. At common law, criminal liability was not imposed upon bank officas for receiving
deposits after insolvency; but by statute in most states officias are now liable to prosecu-
tion. Comment (1934) 43 YA=E L. J. 1304. Under these statutes a substantial number
of courts use as a test of insolvency the one employed in the principal case, while Eome
use the more liberal test of excess of liabilities over value of the assets realizable within
a reasonable time. Appelget v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 125, 243 Pac. 251 (1926); Ellis v.
State, 138 Wis. 513, 119 N. W. 1110 (1909).
19. Garrett v. Tunnicliffe, 107 Fla. 393, 145 So. 213 (1932); Denny v. Thomplon,
236 Ky. 714, 33 S. W. (2d) 670 (1930); Steele v. Commissioner of Banks, 240 fass. 394,
134 N. E. 401 (1922); Note (1933) 8S A. L. R. 811. Hence, even though the asse ts
of the bank may exceed its liabilities, if it can not meet its daily obligations, it is
insolvent. See Bank v. Yaffey, 102 Fla. 723, 726, 136 So. 399, 401 (1931). But if an
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cases which treat insolvency merely as an insufficiency of assets to meet liabilities
within a reasonable time.20 Under this standard, although the bank may not be
able to meet is current demands for cash, it will still be deemed solvent if it
would have sufficient assets to meet its obligations on liquidation within a reason-
able time.21 A third test, infrequently advanced, combines the other two in con-
tradictory fashion in defining solvency as the ability to pay liabilities within a reason-
able time and insolvency as the inability to meet liabilities as they become due in
the ordinary course of business. 22 But this definition seems unworkable in the
case of a bank which, although able to meet its liabilities within a reasonable time,
and so solvent by this test, may not have sufficient quick assets to meet current
demands, and hence by definition be insolvent.
The best policy would seem to be to adopt the definition of insolvency which
would allow the fewest number of preferences, namely whether the bank was
able to meet demands within a reasonable time. It should further be required that
what is a reasonable time be judged solely from the standpoint of circumstances
existing at the time of the alleged insolvency, and that it be clearly established that
the officials knew or reasonably should have known of the bank's condition. Con-
ditioning a trust theory of recovery upon a showing of these facts would appear to be
fairer to other depositors who have no possible grounds for seeking a preference.
ADmISSIBILITY OF JURORS' AFFIDAVITS TO IMPEACII THE VERDICT
THE defendant was tried before a jury that convicted him on a criminal charge.1
To support a motion for a new trial, the affidavits of two jurors were tendered,
purporting to show that outside the jury room, while the jurors were on the way
to and from dinner, the bailiffs communicated to them that the judge wanted the
defendant found guilty, that unless they reached a verdict they would again be
locked up for the night, and that an important witness could not be produced be-
cause she was dead, a fact unsupported by the evidence. This evidence was excluded
by the trial court upon the theory that affidavits of jurors are generally inadmissible
to impeach their verdict.2 This ruling was affirmed by the court of appeals upon
unexpected run is the only reason for the bank's failure to meet current demands, It has
been held that this is not insolvency. Ferry v. Bank, 15 How. Pr. 445 (N. Y. 1858).
20. Ronchetto v. State Bank, 227 Mo. App. 83, 51 S. W. (2d) 174 (1932).
21. See Dunlap v. Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 576, 161 Pac. 364, 368 (1916).
22. Federal Reserve Bank v. Idaho Ass'n, 8 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), cert.
denied 270 U. S. 646 (1926); see Cronkleton v. Ebmeier, 38 F. (2d) 748, 750 (C. C. A.
8th, 1930).
1. Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio St. 235, 187 N. E. 862 (1933) (defendant, a sheriff,
charged with presenting to county commissioners for payment falsified accounts for supplies
furnished to the county jail for the maintenance of prisoners).
2. Vaise v. Delavel, 1 T. R. 11 (K. B. 1785) (leading case in which Lord Mansfleld
laid down the broad rule). The origin of the rule has been attributed to the doctrine
that no witness shall be heard to allege his own turpitude. This maxim, which apparently
served as the only justification for Lord Mansfield's rule, has been long since discarded.
See 5 Wioaroa, EvmmEc (2d ed. 1923) § 2352; Comment (1915) 64 U. or PA. L. Ruv.
86. The rule is now supported on considerations of public policy. McDonald v. Pless,
238 U. S. 264 (1915); Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 9 Am. Rep, 49 (1871);
Payne v. Burke, 236 App. Div. 527, 260 N. Y. Supp. 259 (4th Dep't, 1932). A few
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the authority of a former Ohio decision in which the court declined to receive
affidavits proving that two of the jurors tossed coins to reach their decision.3 The
supreme court, however, reversed, and the evidence was said to be a valid subject
for court consideration. The court pointed out that in the previous cases vhere
affidavits concerning the jury's decision were inadmissible, the conduct in question
had taken place within the jury room. It reasoned that the primary purpose for
exclusion of such evidence was to protect the secrecy of deliberation that was
essential to the securing of independent judgment and final unanimity among jurors.
Upon that rationale, the supreme court, in reversing the trial court, enunciated a
rule that the jurors may testify as to the existence of any extraneous influence or
as to anything apart from their own deliberations 4 At the same time the court
expressly upheld previous decisions wherein evidence as to the misconduct of jurors
taking place within the jury room was not admitted.5 Thus the Ohio Court has
apparently indicated a rigid set of rules to the effect that conduct of third persons
in or out of the jury room, and conduct of jurors outside the jury room may be
the subject of a juror's affidavit to impeach a verdict, whereas the conduct of jurors
within the jury room is beyond the scope of subsequent inquiry.
If the rule of the Ohio case is designed to protect the secrecy only of the delibar-
ative process by which jurors compose their differences, the argument of the court
does not justify the implication that all conduct of jurors taking place within the
jury room must be excluded from consideration.0  There is no good reason why
courts have held that affidavits will not be admitted either to imp2ach or sustain the
verdict. Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Mle. 227, 98 AU. 743 (1916); State v. Lindeman, 254
N. W. 276 (N. D. 1934); State v. Burke, 124 Wash. 632, 215 Pac. 31 (1923). The u-ual
rule has been fixed by statute in GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 5933: "The affidavits
of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach their verdict?' Non-concurring
jurors in states authorizing non-unanimous verdicts are subject to the same rule. Evans
v. Klusmeyer, 301 Ao. 352, 256 S. W. 1036 (1923); Egan v. Bank, 67 Okla. 163, 169
Pac. 621 (1918); Spain v. Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Co., 78 Ore. 355,
153 Pac. 470 (1915). The privilege of keeping jury deliberations inviolate applies only
to proceedings in which an attempt is made to impeach the verdict. Clark v. United
States, 289 U. S. 1 (1932) (defendant cannot avail himself of the privilege in contempt
proceedings), noted in (1933) 17 MARQ. L. REv. 300; Note (1933) 17 Alrm;. L. REv.
654; (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. RP-v. 100D; Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S. W. (2d)
969 (1933); In re Nunns, 104 IA1isc. 350, 172 N. Y. Supp. 167 (1st Dep't, 1918), noted
in (1919) 19 CoL. L. REv. 416.
3. Schwindt v. Graeff, 109 Ohio St. 404, 142 N. E. 736 (1924).
4. The limitation that the affidavit must show "extraneous influence" or matter "apart
from deliberations" could, of course, be defined to include an introduction of additional
evidence in the jury room by a juror, chance verdicts, or other conduct of jurors. But
these precise issues were presented in the Ohio cases cited in note 5, infra, and the court
in the present case excluded them for the reason that they constituted conduct of the
jury, in the jury room. See the discussion of these cases in the opinion of the instant
case, at page 245, 187 N. E. at 866 (1933). The only Ohio decision overruled by the
present case is the case of Hulet v. Barnett, 10 Ohio 459 (1841), holding that affidavits
are inadmissible to show that a constable intruded into a jury room and insisted upon
stating his views.
5. Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884); Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E.
476 (1889); Schwindt v. Graeff, 109 Ohio St. 404, 142 N. E. 736 (1924).
6. An arbitrary exclusion of all conduct in the jury room obtains in the Minnesota
courts. Hurlburt v. Leachman, 126 Blinn. 180, 148 N. W. 51 (1914); Brown v. Duluth,
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jurors may not, without violence to the "secrecy of deliberation," testify as to
certain aspects of their own conduct within the jury room. Thus the introduction
of affidavits to show that the verdict was reached by chance, allowed by several
state statutes,7 does not defeat the object of the Ohio court, since a chance verdict,
rather than being an element of the deliberative function is a restraint upon it.
The less restrictive rule of the Iowa courts, under which affidavits of jurors are
received to show any matter not characterized as essentially "inhering" in the
verdict,8 seems fully to guarantee to the jury that secrecy of deliberation which
is sought in the present case. Under that rule affidavits are also admissible to show
that the verdict was determined by lot,9 or to show that the jury considered evidence
not produced on the trial,' 0 both of which are said to be facts "independent" of the
verdict itself and of the deliberations; whereas, affidavits are incompetent to show
South Shore and Atlantic Ry. Co., 147 Minn. 167, 179 N. W. 1003 (1920); State v. Cater,
252 N. W. 421 (Minn. 1934); see (1921) 5 MirN. L. Rzv. 235. In Missouri a juror
Will not be heard to impeach a verdict regardless of whether the alleged misconduct
occurred inside or outside the jury room. Steffen v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
331 Mo. 574, 56 S. W. (2d) 47 (1932).
7. "And whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any
general or special verdict . . . by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct
may be proved by the affidavits of any one of the jurors." CAL. CODE C1v. Pitoc.
(Deering, 1931) § 657. It is held that this provision is exclusive, and that no other type
of misconduct can be shown by the affidavits of jurors. Mirabito v. San Francisco
Dairy Co., 75 Cal. App. Dec. 603, 27 P. (2d) 106 (1933). Seven other states have similar
statutes: CoLo. CODE CEV. PRoc. ANN. (Mills, 1933) § 236; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932)
§ 7-602; Ky. CODES ANN. (Carroll, 1932) CaMM. PRAC. § 272; Cox v. Commonwealth, 74
S. W. (2d) 346 (Ky. 1934) (criminal cases only); MoNT. REV. CODE ANN. (Choate, 1921)
§ 9397; N. D. ComP. LAWS ANt. (1913) § 7660; S. D. Coa-P. LAWS (1929) § 2555;
UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 104-40-2. Less restrictive statutes are found elsewhere,
providing generally for admissibility of affidavits by jurors. ARiz. REv. CODE A w.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 5097; Tn-x. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 2234; TEx. ANN.
CODE Cn.r. PROC. (Vernon, 1925) art. 753.
8. Wright v. Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866). The theory upon which the dis-
tinction is based is that matters not inhering in the verdict are capable of disproof by
the remaining jurors if false, while matters inhering in the verdict lie solely within the
knowledge of the juror who makes the affidavit and so cannot be verified or contradicted.
The doctrine has been approved by the United States Supreme Court in Mattox v. United
States, 146 U. S. 140 (1892). For other applications of the rule see Southern Pacific Co.
v. Klinge, 65 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); City of Amarillo v. Emery, 69 F. (2d)
626 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Linsley v. State, 88 Fla. 135, 101 So. 273 (1924); Perry v.
Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Harris v. State, 24 Neb. 803, 40 N. W. 317 (1888); cf.
Lancaster v. United States, 39 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). The rule has been
commented on favorably many times. See Note (1926) 11 IowA L. REv. 268; (1915)
1 IowA L. REv. 100; (1918) 4 IOWA L. REV. 130; Note (1914) 12 Micir. L. REv. 405;
(1925) 23 MIcn. L. REV. 550; Comment (1915) 64 U. or PA. L. Ray. 86; Huougs,
EVIDENCE (1907) 305; 5 WiGOROE, EvmFaxca § 2353.
9. Manix v. Malony, 7 Iowa 81 (1858) (quotient verdict); cf. Bryson v. Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Ry. Co., 89 Iowa 677, 57 N. W. 430 (1894) (affidavits of a
compromise verdict not admitted); People v. Geisler, 348 Ill. 510, 181 N. E. 328 (1932),
It is not clear that a quotient verdict should be considered such misconduct by the jurorg
as to support a motion for a new trial. Such a method of reaching a verdict may well
be the most logical and practical" method of resolving certain differences among the jurorg.
1935] NOTES
that a juror misunderstood the court's instructionsP or was unduly influenced
by his fellow jurors,' 2 both of which are integral parts of the strictly deliberative
activities of the jury. And the very rationale of the Ohio case has been urged
in support of the Iowa rule.13
The Iowa and Ohio rules, while they both preserve the privacy of jury deber-
ations proper, suggest two distinct attitudes toward a jury verdict, neither one of
which is compatible with the other, yet neither one of which is without support.
On the one hand, from the Iowa point of view, the process of decision assumes a
position of first importance, and the conduct of the jury is carefully supervised
by the court. Thus, a new trial was granted when affidavits showed that two jurors
discussed from their personal experience the value of white pine and other trees,
a material issue in an action to recover damages for destruction of trees by gas
fumes,' 4 and when the jurors had access to a law book while arriving at a decision.15
The aim is to insure to the parties that verdicts will be based on ethical and lawful
deliberation by the jurors upon the facts presented at the trial. And it might he
argued that the rule tends to deter jurors from resorting to non-deliberative tactics
and to promote confidence in jury verdicts.
On the other hand, the categorical Ohio doctrine suggests a more practical and
realistic philosophy. A rule of thumb automatically excludes the introduction of
evidence showing the conduct of the jury in the jury room, and thus relegates
the process of decision to a secondary position. The rule is arbitrary.1 0 Yet the
and it rarely indicates that the jury never deliberated at alL The authorities split as
to its admissibility by affidavits of jurors. Affidavits of a quotient verdict were excluded
in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264 (1915); Bank of Cottonwood v. Hood, 227 Ala.
237, 149 So. 676 (1933); Hull v. Larson, 14 Ariz. 492, 131 Pac. 668 (1913); McKee v.
Assad, 169 Miss. 496, 153 So. 799 (1934). Contra: Oklahoma, Kansas and Irmsouri Ry.
Co. v. McGhee, 84 Okla. 116, 202 Pac. 277 (1921), noted in (1922) 6 Mln:. L. P,.
332; Dallas Railway and Terminal Co. v. Garner, 63 S. W. (2d) 542 (Tex. 1933).
10. Douglass v. Agne, 125 Iowa 67, 99 N. W. 550 (1904); State v. Kirk, 163 Io-a
244, 150 N. W. 91 (1914).
11. Christ v. City of Webster City, 105 Iowa 119, 74 N. W. 743 (1893); Cadle v.
McHargue, 249 Ky. 385, 60 S. W. (2d) 973 (1933).
12. Purcell v. Tibbles, 101 Iowa 24, 69 N. W. 1120 (1897); Ward v. Thompson, 4,
Iowa 588 (1878) (misapprehension of the law); see note 17, infra.
13. "It (the Iowa rule) commends itself for the protection it affords litigants against
a verdict obtained by unlawful means, and at the same time it enshrines the delibations
of juries in the jury room with that mantle of secrecy which the policy of the law
has always designed to secure, in order that a verdict may be the united judgment of
all sworn to try the cause." Annotation, 24 Am. Dec. 477 (1886).
14. Stevenson v. Tennessee Copper Co., 193 Fed. 263 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1911);
Marshall v. North Branch Transfer Co., 166 Tenn. 96, 59 S. W. (2d) 520 (1933) (jury
discussed question of insurance in personal-injury action).
15. Linsley v. State, 88 Fla. 135, 101 So. 273 (1924); see note 9, supra.
16. The rule can be supported on the same grounds which are urged in support of
the general rule that affidavits shall be excluded. See McDonald v. Pess, 238 U. S. 264,
267 (1915); Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1, 13 (1932). The rule minim!ze the
danger that dissatisfied litigants will make contacts with complacent juror-, following the
rendition of the verdict. See Consolidated Rendering Co. v. New Haven Hotel Co, 30
Fed. 627, 634 (D. Conn. 1924); see cases cited note 2, supra. During retirement jurors
are presumed to be properly performing their functions. See Anderson v. Thompon,
137 Kan. 754, 758, 22 P. (2d) 438, 440 (1933); Hurlburt v. Leachman, 126 zinn. 1E0,
184, 148 N. W. 51, 52 (1914).
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process by which a jury reaches a final judgment is subject to so many factual
and mental variables, and is so little understood, that regulation of the method by
which a verdict is reached would seem to be of doubtful utility; particularly is
this true in view of the practical advantages afforded by the application of the Ohio
rule. In the first place, such a rule eliminates entirely the problem, elsewhere
subject to the uncertainty of judicial discretion, of ascertaining whether the evidence
which the moving party offers to prove is admissible by affidavits of jurors, that is,
whether the irregularities complained of are a part of the deliberative or non-
deliberative activities of the jury.1 7 Secondly, and probably most important, the
rule totally obviates the opportunity for wholesale reversals and extended litigation,
such as is involved in the observance of a more liberal rule.18 Further, the rule
not only prevents all occasion for uncertainty and instability of verdicts, but also
prevents all occasion for injurious suspicions of jury conduct. In other words, the
prestige of the jury will be better maintained. Consequently, the Ohio rule, although
it goes further than its rationale demands, serves a very definite purpose in doing so.
RECOVERY BY TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF DIVIDENDS DISTRIBUTED UNDER A
CONFIRMED COMPOSITION SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED
IN 1932, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed by creditors against
an insolvent corporation. In order to avoid the distribution of the estate in bank-
ruptcy, the debtor, after filing with the court a list of its creditors and a schedule
of assets, offered to ransom the estate from creditors by paying each a pro rata
part of his debt.' A majority of the creditors in number and amount accepted
17. The difficulty in saying what matters inhere in the verdict and what matters do
not is admirably illustrated by a comparison of a few cases decided in Iowa, the result
of which is to indicate the impracticality of the rule. Affidavits were admitted in the
following cases, it being said that the matters complained of did not inhere in the verdict:
Cresswell v. Wainwright, 154 Iowa 167, 134 N. W. 594 (1912) (juror said defendant was
able to pay any sum and he had seen him driving recklessly before); State v. Wegener,
180 Iowa 102, 162 N. W. 1040 (1917) (juror said he had been told on good authority
that defendant had committed a previous crime); State v. Salmer, 181 Iowa 280, 164
N. W. 620 (1917) (juror stated defendant was a drunkard). But affidavits were refuged
in the following, it being said that the matters complained of inhered in the verdict:
Cowles v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rr. Co., 32 Iowa 515 (1871) (juror read
part of answer which had been held bad on demurrer); Dunlavey v. Watson, 38 Iowa
398 (1874) (juror said he knew "Our Own Bourbon Bitters" were intoxicating as lie
had seen someone get drunk as a fool on them).
18. The frequency of extended litigation in a jurisdiction where a liberal rule of
admissibility prevails is indicated by the number and variety of cases cited in notes 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, supra. For a severe criticism of the statutory rule In Texas
which allows affidavits to be introduced freely see (1932) 45 HARv. L. REV. 746,
1. Under Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act a creditor may purchase his estate from hi
creditors after the filing of the petition and either before or after adjudication. 36 STAT.
839 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. 30 (1926). Upon confirmation by the court, title to the property
revests in the bankrupt. 32 STAT. 800 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. 110 (1926). Cumberland
Glass Manufacturing Co. v. DeWitt & Co., 237 U. S. 447 (1915); Wheeling Structural Steel
Co. v. Moss, 62 F. (2d) 37, 39 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
The composition frees the debtor from all his debts provable in bankruptcy. The offer
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the offer,2 and in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the com-
position was submitted for the approval of the Federal District Court.3 Despite
the specifications of the dissenting creditors, the composition agreement was con-
firmed,4 and the funds deposited by the bankrupt were ordered to be distributed
within ten days in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 5 No attempt was
made by the dissenting creditors to obtain a stay of execution; but after the funds
had been distributed to other creditors, they refused the dividends offered them and
appealed the confirmation. 6 The Circuit Court reversed;7 the estate was subse-
quently adjudicated in bankruptcy, and a trustee appointed.8 Application was made
by the trustee to require of assenting creditors restitution of the dividends they
had received. Although refused by the referee, the application was granted by the
district court whose decision, apparently the first on the question, was affirmed on
appeal.9 It was held that the right of the bankrupt to redeem his estate became
non-existent upon reversal, and the right of creditors to retain the assets under
such an agreement had been equally destroyed. 10
The soundness of a decision, which states as a general rule that a trustee may
recover the assets of a bankrupt estate upon reversal of the composition, is not
dosed to question. Thus, the objection may be raised that a court of bankruptcy,
being a creature of statute, is limited in its power to the express provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act;1 and since there is no provision authorizing the court to require
restitution in such an instance, such action is beyond its jurisdiction. But even
must be made by the bankrupt. Nassau Works v. Brightwood, 265 U. S. 269, 271 (1924,;
In re Laubheim, 22 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927).
2. Not all creditors need assent. In re Ullman, 10 Fed. 944 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); 7
RE=GrO-, B.- Rxupc Y (1934) § 3051.
3. In re Laubheim, 22 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
4. The confirmation of the composition is in effect a discharge. 7 Rrr=xro:., op. cit.
supra note 2, § 3059. Specific objections must be filed by those creditors who refuse to
sign the composition. In re Rikin, 216 Fed. 218 (D. Conn. 1914).
5. In re Everick Art Corp., 39 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). The court appaints
a distributing agent after the confirmation. Zavalo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 632 (1913).
He may be the court clerk, referee, trustee or any other person.
6. Confirmations are reviewable. In re Gottlieb, 262 Fed. 730 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
One may not, however, accept the benefits of a composition, and appeal its validity. Oriole
Phonograph Co. v. Kansas City Fabric Products Co., 34 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
7. A discharge may be reversed on the following grounds: (1) it is not to the b-t
interests of creditors; (2) the bankrupt has been guilty of any act that would prevent
his discharge; (3) the offer and acceptance were not in good faith. See 7 R= ro:;, op.
cit. supra note 2, §§ 3103-3122.
In this case, materially false statements respecting financial condition made by the ban!:-
rupt were considered grounds for reversal. In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co. Inc., 64 F.
(2d) 404 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
S. If a composition is not confirmed, the estate is administered in bankruptcy. Cumber-
land Glass Manufacturing Co. v. DeWitt & Co., 237 U. S. 447 (1915).
9. In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co., Inc., 73 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). There
have been some doubtful dicta in regard to this question. Cf. In re Roukoua, 123 Fed.
645 (D. R. I., 1904); see Field and Co. v. Wolf, 120 Fed. 815, 816 (C. C. A. 8th, 19t3).
10. In a composition the creditors do not take a part of the debtor's estate as such but
a sum bargained for.
11. See Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Carter, 61 F. (2d) 986, 9S3 (C. C. A. Sth, 1932);
Wheeling Structural Steel Co. v. Moss, 62 F. (2d) 37, 39 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
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if it is assumed that the court has authority to grant the application of the trustee,
it might be argued that the court should not exercise its power. Thus assenting
creditors, who have accepted the bankrupt's offer to secure ready assets without
the delay incident to bankruptcy adjudication may have assumed various financial
obligations,12 or otherwise changed their positions in reliance on the funds received;
to make them return these dividends may well be to subject them to unduly harsh
consequences. Furthermore, the estate in which the assenting crditors will now
be required to share has been irretrievably diminished by the fact that some of
these creditors are either without the jurisdiction of the court and its summary
order,' 3 or have possibly become insolvent. All of these unfortunate consequences,
however, could have been avoided if the dissenting creditors had moved for a stay
of execution. Hence, their failure to act, although they knew or should have known
of the possibility of injury to creditors that might result from an order of restitu-
tion, could be said to estop them and the trustee in bankruptcy, really their agent, 14
from recovering the dividends.1' And invocation of estoppel might be further justified
where, as in the instant jurisdiction, assenting creditors are not necessary parties
to the appeal of the composition agreement and are, to that extent, deprived of
the opportunity to defend their interest.' 6
These arguments do not however conclusively demonstrate that the court erred
in the principal case or that its decision was otherwise unjustifiable. The power
and authority of the court and its trustee to require restitution may be predicated
on three grounds: the necessity of a broad interpretation of all acts, such as the
Bankruptcy Act, which assign to the courts administrative functions; the general
equity powers of the court; 17 and the duty of the trustee under the Act to gather
in and distribute the estate equally among all creditors.' 8 In fact, such power and
authority may be inferred directly from the jurisdiction of the court to entertain
an appeal of the confirmation. It has generally been held an inherent power of alr
courts to require the return of the funds distributed through their own agenices,
since appeal connotes the right of the court upon reversing error to return the
parties to their original position.' 9 Moreover, in face of the admitted purpose in
bankruptcy to effect a ratable distribution of all the debtor's assets which can be,
reached, it is not clear that the court should have refused to exercise the equitable
12. Speed is an important element in composition agreements. Nassau Works v. Bright-
wood Co., 265 U. S. 269, 272 (1924). The practical effect of the holding in the principal
case is to delay, perhaps intolerably, the time when a creditor who accepts composition
dividends can feel that he is free from any restraint in disposing thereof.
13. This may result in a total loss to the estate of such funds, or at least the cost
of the trustee's bringing a plenary suit for their recovery.
14. In re Bothe, 173 Fed. 597 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); McGovern v. Kraus, 192 Wig. 564,
213 N. W. 334 (1927).
15. See In re Kass, 263 Fed. 138, 139 (E. D. N. Y. 1916); In re Vandeweghe, 49 F.
(2d) 939, 41 (S. D. N. Y., 1931).
16. In re Gottlieb, 262 Fed. 730, 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), and cases cited therein, One
court has required that assenting creditors be made parties to the appeal. Field and Co.
v. Wolf 120 Fed. 815, 816 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
17. Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918); Seaboard
.National Bank v. Rogers Milk Products, 21 F. (2d) 414, 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
18. In re Baudouine, 101 Fed. 574 (C. C. A. 2d, 1900); In re Bothe, 173 Fed. 597,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
19. Heydenfeldt v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 117 Cat.
348, 49 Pac. 210 (1897); ler v. Hiler, 35 Ohio St. 645 (1880).
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power of compelling restitution. The inequities urged against this order are de-
creased by the fact that the trustee may minimize the diminution by bringing plenary
proceedings against the creditors who are outside the jurisdiction of the court. The
basis of the claim for estoppel is weakened by the fact that it is not certain that
an application for a stay of execution would have prevented the injury since the
court might have refused to grant the stay.20  On the other hand, it is arguable
that the existence of known dissentients and the statutory right of appeal gave
ample notice to assenting creditors that the question might arise and that restitution
might be required by the court. Certainly courts in similar situations have held
with apparent unanimity that money received pursuant to an order, judgment or
decree, subsequently reversed, may not be retained by the distributees.2  In any
event, the inequities that may result to the assenting creditors and the alleged laches
of the dissenting creditors are not so conclusive as to justify disturbance of the
ratable distribution in bankruptcy and to avoid the application of the general theory
of appeal which assumes, that upon reversal, the parties may be returned to as
nearly the same position as if no decree or judgment had been rendered.
DOUBLE COMPENSATION FOR TESTAMENTARY FIDUCiARY ACTING AS
BOTH EXEcUTOR AND TRUSTEE
TnE question of compensation for testamentary fiduciaries has long been a fruitful
source of appellate litigation. English courts have denied all remuneration,' but in
the United States some compensation for services rendered has probably always been
awarded. 2 Today statutes in nearly every state regulate the commissions of executors
and administrators. In several the matter is left entirely to the discretion of the
court; 3 in others compensation, although discretionary, is subject to a maximum; 4
and in many the statutory percentage is made mandatory.5 Legislative regulation of
20. Haebler v. Mleyers, 132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E. 963 (1892).
21. Ashton v. Heydenfeldt, 127 Cal. 442, 59 Pac. 759 (190D); Chamberlain v. Choles,
35 N. Y. 477, 479 (1866); Peyser v. Mlayor etc., 70 N. Y. 497 (1887); Scholey v. Halsy.
72 N. Y. 578 (1878); Haebler v. Mlyers, 132 N. Y. 363, 368, 30 N. E. 963, 964 (1892); Pitts-
field National Bank v. Bayne, 140 N. Y. 321, 35 N. E. 360 (1893); Bedell Co. v. Harris,
22S App. Div. 529, 240 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Ist Dep't, 1930).
22. Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U. S. 216 (1891); cf. Bank of United States
v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128 (U. S. 1834).
1. BOGERT, TausTs (1921) 407-408; LEvw, LAW or TRusTs (13th ed. 1928) 455.
2. Vierling, Compensation of Executors (1925) 10 ST. Louis L. Rz,. 225.
3. LN'D. STAT. Am. (Burns, 1926) § 3249; KANS. REv. STAT. Am.; (1933) c. 22, § 919;
MAss. GENx. LAws. (1932) c. 206, § 16; Alm-N. STAT. (Mfason, 1927) § 8788; R. I. GE:;.
LAws (1923) § 5616; TEm. CODE ANeN. (Williams, 1934) § 8250; VA. CoE A-,:;. (Blichie,
1930) § 5425. Four states have adopted this method by judicial construction. Comment
(1933) 42 YA=E L. J. 771, 772.
4. A.A. CODE AmN. (Mlichie, 1928) § 5923; CoLO. A,,N . STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 8032;
FLA. ComP. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927) § 5541; IOWA CODE (1931) § 12053; Ky. STAT.
(Carroll, 1930) § 3883; AID. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 93, § 5; Miss. CODE Aa.n.
(1930) § 1740; N. J. Comxm. STAT. (1910) pp. 3859, 3860; N. C. CODE AN:.. (Ilchie, 1931)
§ 157.
5. See Comment (1933) 42 YA=E L. J. 771 for a complete list of statutes.
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compensation for trustees has been less frequent, however, the commission ordinarily
being made discretionary by statute6 and by judicial construction in the absence of
statute,7 although in a few instancei it is prescribed as arbitrarily as that for
executors.8 Frequently a testator, in addition to designating an executor, names a
trustee to administer testamentary trusts. Where the fiduciaries so named arc
different persons, there is no question but that each will be entitled to separate
compensation; 9 but if one person, individual or corporate, is designated as both
executor and trustee, there is presented for decision "the perennially controversial
question"'1 of whether he is entitled to double commissions.
In those states in which the award of compensation to fiduciaries is largely dis-
cretionary, probably little difficulty is encountered in this situation in fixing a satis-
factory amount, since the court is free to exercise its own judgment as to the value
of the total services rendered." It is only in those jurisdictions wherein the com-
pensation of both executor and trustee is specifically prescribed by statute that the
problem assumes importance.' 2 One solution to the difficulty would be arbitrarily to
award double compensation if the single fiduciary were called upon to perform cus-
tomary trust functions as well as executorial duties. The duties of an executor in
collecting assets, liquidating the estate, and distributing the legacies"8 rarely extend
beyond a year or eighteen months.14 On the other hand, the duties in general of a
trustee in holding, managing and caring for the property, paying over the income, and
ultimately distributing the principal to the remaindermen, necessarily contemplate
an extended administration.' 5 Therefore any duty to care for and manage property
beyond the usual period for an executor's activities could be deemed a trust function
and compensated accordingly. Since double commissions would be given if there
were two fiduciaries instead of one there seems no logical reason for denying double
compensation for the same work when performed by a single fiduciary.' 0 This
6. CAL. PROB. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1122; Dxi.. REV. Coot (1915) § 3880; MASS,
GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 206, § 16; MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. (Choate, 1921) § 10353; N. J.
CoAw. STAT. (1910) pp. 3859-3860.
7. Caldwell v. Hopkins, 265 Fed. 972 (App. D. C. 1920); Humphrey v. McClain, 219
Ky. 180, 292 S. W. 794 (1927).
8. GA. CODE ANN. (QMchie, 1926) § 3777; Micu. Comp. LAws (1929) § 15896; N. Y.
SuRR. CT. AcT (Parsons, 1934) § 285; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 9048.
9. Phoenix v. Livingston, 101 N. Y. 451, 5 N. E. 70 (1886). See Matter of Schllemann,
259 N. Y. 497, 502, 182 N. E. 153, 155 (1932); Matter of Rosenthal, 141 Misc. 404, 405,
252 N. Y. Supp. 596, 598 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
10. Matter of Abrahams, 136 Misc. 538, 241 N. Y. Supp. 212, 214 (Surr. Ct. 1930),
11. Chase v. Lathrop, 74 Colo. 559, 223 Pac. 54 (1924); Kennedy v. Dickey, 99 Md.
295, 57 Atl. 621 (1904); Spratt v. Baldwin, 33 Miss. 581 (1857). The fact that in most
states compensation is discretionary undoubtedly accounts for the paucity of decisions
throughout the country upon the subject of double commissions.
12. See note 8, supra. In Pennsylvania alone, a statute expressly denies double com-
missions to a fiduciary serving in a dual capacity. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) art. 20,
§ 813; Von Storch Estate, 88 Pa. Sup. Ct. 43 (1926).
13. Burbank's Administratrix v. Duncan, 53 S. W. 19 (Ky. 1899); In re Hibbler's
Estate, 78 N. J. Eq. 217, 78 Atl. 188 (1910); Drake v. Price, 5 N. Y. 430 (1851).
14. See Matter of Union Trust Co., 70 App. Div. 5, 10, 75 N. Y. Supp. 68, 71 (1st
Dep't, 1902).
15. Cf. Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 AtI. 648 (1929); BoGERT, TRUsTs (1921)
329 et seq.
16. Of course such a conclusion overlooks the fact that where a second person serves as
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functional distinction has occasionally been adopted as the criterion upon which to
base double commissions.' 7 New York, however, has refused sanction to this view,
and New Jersey has recently indicated a trend in the direction of the New York
casesjis
The problem is particularly acute in New York, since it is one of the jurisdictions
which now has a statutory rate of compensation for both executors and trustees, and
since the estates administered under its laws are necessarily numerous and sub-
stantial in value. Formerly double commissions were frequently allowed the fiduciary
for his services. But with the adoption of the Civil Practice Act in 1921, the com-
pensation of executors and trustees was substantially increased so that even for a
single commission, the statutory amounts are probably excessive, since "it is a matter
of common knowledge that the average executor usually does little in the administra-
tion of the estate, leaving the active conduct of its affairs to the attorney.!" O Subse-
quent to this statutory enactment and particularly in very recent years, an avalanche
of opinions, some awarding, -° but most denying,2 ' double commissions indicates an
apparent reaction against any matter of course award. According to the rationale
now prevailing in the New York courts, double commissions will be granted only wihere
there is an indication of the testator's intent to end the executor's duties at some
definitely ascertainable point of time, and to require him thereupon to set up one
or more trustsY"2 Unless this intention is so manifested, title is not deemed to pas3
from the executor to himself as trustee, the executor has not consequently distributed,
and therefore he is not entitled to a distributing commission as executor nor to a
receiving commission as trustee.m
trustee he is faced with the problem of familiarizing himself with the estate; an executor,
however, continuing as trustee, already possesses this knowledge and this fact op-rates to
reduce his work.
17. State v. Beardsley, 77 Fla. 803, 82 So. 794 (1919); Pitney v. Everson, 42 N. J. Eq.
361 (1886); In re Hibbler's Estate, 7S N. J. Eq. 217, 78 AUt. 188 (1910).
18. Cf. Parker v. Wright, 103 N. J. Eq. 535, 143 At. 870 (1928).
19. Matter of Jackson, 138 Misc. 167, 169, 245 N. Y. Supp. 156, 158 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
The New York statute now provides, "On the settlement of the account of any executor,
administrator, ... or testamentary trustee,... the surrogate must allow to such executor,
administrator, . . . or testamentary trustee for his services in such official capacity" a
specified percentage based upon the quantum of the estate. N. Y. Sunn. CT. Act (Parsons,
1934) § 285.
20. Matter of Abrahams, 136 Misc. 538, 241 N. Y. Supp. 212 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter
of Halbert, 141 Misc. 181, 252 N. Y. Supp. 355 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of AMAnn, 145
Misc. 360, 260 N. Y. Supp. 287 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
21. Matter of Glenn, 231 App. Div. 6S1, 248 N. Y. Supp. 530 (4th Dep't, 1931), aTd,
258 N. Y. 536, 180 N. E. 322 (1931); Matter of Coutts, 260 N. Y. 128, 183 N. E. Z0
(1932); Matter of Core, 241 App. Div. 311, 271 N. Y. Supp. 429 (2d Dep't, 1934);
Matter of Jackson, 138 Misc. 167, 245 N. Y. Supp. 156 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of
Rappold, 138 Misc. 163, 245 N. Y. Supp. 169 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of Morn, 136
Misc. 823, 242 N. Y. Supp. 230 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of Galloway, 139 Misc. 13, 24S
N. Y. Supp. 153 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of Espenscbeid, 140 Misc. 53, 250 N. Y. Supp.
556 (Sur. Ct. 1931) ; Matter of Lite, 142 Misc. 793, 255 N. Y. Supp. 536 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ;
Matter of Quinlan, 147 Misc. 483, 264 N. Y. Supp. 257 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of
Gregory, 150 Misc. 610, 269 N. Y. Supp. 880 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
22. Olcott v. Baldwin, 190 N. Y. 99, 82 N. E. 748 (1907) ; Matter of Ziegler, 218 N. Y.
544, 113 N. E. 553 (1916).
23. Matter of Schliemann, 259 N. Y. 497, 182 N. E. 153 (1932); see Dor ,; Esr,,=
ADmmasATimzAND AccOunrO (1932) 356.
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Difficulty in reaching this distinction frequently arises when a particular will,
instead of ordering the executor to hold property in trust, directs the fiduciary to
make long deferred payments of bequests to beneficiaries, either accumulating income
for a long period or paying it out periodically. The mere fact that the fiduciary is
to pay income for a long period, it is said, does not convert his status into that of a
trustee, in the absence of testamentary intent to the contrary, since the duties as
executor have not by the will been terminated until distribution of legacies.24 The
quest for the testator's intention in this situation to create a dual or single capacity
in the fiduciary cannot generally prove helpful, except as a matter of rationalization,
since it is probable that the testator had no specific intent in either direction.2
Furthermore, if the fiction of intent is to be indulged, the fact that a testator de-
volves upon one person functions akin to both those of executor and trustee should
necessarily lead to the presumption that separate functions were intended. In
addition, if the will directs the executor to make a postponed payment of legacies,
it could well be contended that he in fact becomes a trustee clothed with legal title,
and that the effect of the will is to make him the legal legatee subject to subsequent
payment to the cestuis. Consequently there is no delay in the payment of a legacy.
Under this analysis, the termination of the duties as executor would be the point
of time at which, after all other details of administration have been completed, the
order of distribution to all legatees would usually be made.2 6 It would be at this
time that title would be deemed to pass from him as executor and to him as trustee.
In denying double commissions to a fiduciary by resort to this fictitious expression
of testamentary intent, the recent New York cases appear to approximate somewhat
in result the decisions reached in those states where compensation is discretionary.
For it seems a fair inference from the cases that a dual award will be denied where-
ever the value of the services rendered are actually in gross disproportion to the
high statutory fees authorized.27 While this result may be commendable in a prac-
tical sense as reducing an excessive burden on particular estates, it ignores the literal
force of the statute. It would seem preferable to alter the legislative mandate now
24. "It is the duty of an executor as such to pay to a legatee the amount of the legacy
in the manner and at the time provided by the testator, and it does not change that duty
that the payment of the principal is postponed and the income made payable annually In
the meantime." McAlpine v. Potter, 126 N. Y. 285, 289, 27 N. E. 475, 476 (1891).
25. See Matter of Jackson, 138 Misc. 167, 170, 245 N. Y. Supp. 156, 158 (Surr. Ct.
1930). The attempt to discover the intent of a testator has occasionally been carried to
an absurdity, counsel in one case seriously contending that, because the deceased was of
Scotch descent, it was his intention to grant only a single commission, See Matter of
Halbert, 141 Misc. 181, 182, 252 N. Y. Supp. 355, 356 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
26. Just as a decree settling the executor's account is not conclusive that the executor's
duties have terminated and the trustee's obligations have begun, Matter of Ziegler, 218
N. Y. 544, 113 N. E. 553 (1916), so failure to get such a decree is not conclusive that
he has not terminated his duties as executor. Olcott v. Baldwin, 190 N. Y. 99, 82 N. E.
748 (1907); Matter of Schliemann, 235 App. Div. 635, 254 N. Y. Supp. 810 (2d Dep't,
1932), rev'd, 259 N. Y. 497, 182 N. E. 153 (1932).
27. Matter of Abrahams, 136 Misc. 538, 241 N. Y. Supp. 212 (Surr. Ct. 1930) purported
to set out a series of rules to be followed in reaching a decision. As verbal expositions to
justify a decision, and as a basis for argumentation these rules do possess merit. As an
actual aid, however, their value is slight. Their uncertainty is shown by the differing
opinions expressed in Matter of Schliemann, 259 N. Y. 497, 182 N. E. 153 (1932), rev'g
235 App. Div. 635, 254 N. Y. Supp, 810 (2d Dep't, 1932), which had reversed 140 MIsc.
230, 250 N. Y. Supp. 254 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
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expressly prescribing fees, and to grant double compensation, making it entirely
discretionary in amount with the court.s
LIAILITY oF DIRECTORS TO CORPORATION FOR EXPLOITING CORPORATE OPPORTUNI-
TIES
THE dispersion of stock ownership in the modem corporation, and the use of
various management devices, frequently places the effective control of corporate
affairs in the hands of a few strategically situated officers and directors.1 The power
of these directors to contract for the corporation and to invest its assets enables
them to benefit themselves and other business interests with which they are associated.
The exercise of such flexible and concentrated authority may be beneficial to stock-
holders as well as to the directors. But it undeniably affords ample opportunity for
depriving stockholders of their rights.2 Instances of such abuse have resulted in
frequent litigation by stockholders, in which the courts have been asked to define
the duty owed by the directors to the corporation. But since the complexity of
modem business creates an infinite variety of circumstances in which these problems
may arise, many of the legal rules designed to prevent the deprivation of stock-
holders' rights are not easily applied to particular situations.
Two general attitudes have been expressed by the courts in defining the obligations
of directors to the corporation as an entity, as distinguished from their liability to
individual members.3 Under the first view, stockholders will not be permitted to
avoid transactions involving the interest of the directors and the corporation; nor
may they require an accounting for profits earned by the directors, if upon examina-
tion of the facts, the court finds the dealings were fair," and the interests of the
corporation were not unduly prejudiced.5 Accordingly, a director has been allowed
to purchase from or sell to his corporation provided that the corporation was not
adversely affected, a fair consideration was exchanged,0 and a majority of the
28. See Notes (1932) 17 Inrs=. L. Rv. 212 and (1932) 7 ST. Jom.'s L. Rzv. 118.
1. Bm.L, STuDms er run L w or CoRoAnoi FIYAnCu (1928) 41 et seq.; Benan AnD
MxssA-s, THE MoDmR CORPORATION' -AND PRVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2. Id. at 119 et seq.; Berle, Non-Voting Stock and Bankers' Control (1926) 39 Hrmv.
L. R v. 673.
3. The problem of liability to individual stockholders often arises upon sale or purchas-
of stock between director and stockholder when the director has superior information con-
cerning the condition of the corporation. The legal questions involved herein are not to
be confused with the present cases since courts generally admit a greater obligation by
directors to the corporate entity as'such. For cases in regard to such liability see Strong
v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909); Hooker v. The Midland Steel Co., 215 I]. 444, 74 N. E.
445 (1905); Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. 108 (1874); Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310,
92 S. E. 454 (1916); 3 Coon oN CoRpoRATioNs (8th ed. 1923) § 648; Note (1930) 14 M:;.
L. RAN. 530.
4. Davis v. Pearce, 30 F. (2d) 85, 89 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Grand Amusement Co. v.
Palladium, 315 Mo. 907, 287 S. W. 438 (1926); Note (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 593.
5. The president of a corporation was permitted to buy a corporation debt and fore-
close thereon. Stack v. Welder, 137 Cal. App. 647, 31 P. (2d) 426 (1934); 3 FrLETCBE,
CvcLDPEoiA or = LAW or PprvATE CoRpoRATOns (Rev. ed. 1931) §§ 919-921.
6. In Lazenby v. Henderson, 241 Mass. 177, 135 N. E. 302 (1922) it was held that if a
director of one corporation buys for the benefit of another corporation of which he is also
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directors were concerned only with the interests of the corporation, 7 Similarly, a
director has been held privileged to engage in a business like that of the corporation,
if his interests did not actually conflict,8 or to take advantage of an opportunity
offered the corporation, if insufficient funds or other reasons made purchase by the
corporation impossible.9
The opposing policy, found in a few states under various circumstances,' 0 frankly
recognizes that the infinite details of business relations, and the frequent secret
understandings between directors and other business interests, render dubious the
accuracy and advisability of judicial fact finding. Consequently no attempt has been
made to apply a general standard of fairness to particular cases or to determine
whether the corportion has been injured. 1 Transactions in which directors were
personally interested have been held avoidable; or if consummated, the profits have
been awarded to the corporation.12  Thus directors have been deterred from
assuming an interest in conflict with that of the corporation, 13 and have been denied
a director, the second corporation is chargeable for profits if the price was not absolutely
adequate. Intent to defraud is unnecessary.
7. 3 FLErcHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 950. There has been a tendency in some cases to
dispense with the necessity of a disinterested majority on the board. BMALANTm , MANU=
oF COas'ORATON LAW AND PRACTIc. (2d ed. 1930) 390.
8. Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 51 Fed. 33 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1892); Murray v.
Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140, 156, 157 (N. Y. 1863) (corporation was completely insolvent, and
the decision is limited strictly to the facts). In Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. (2d)
436 (N. D. Cal. 1931) it was held the corporation was injured. See also Coleman v.
Hanger, 210 Ky. 309, 275 S. W. 784 (1925). In Homer v. New South Oilmill, 130 Ark. 551,
197 S. W. 1163 (1917) a patent conflict of interest did not affect the validity of the purchase
of a corporate debt bought by one of its directors for the benefit of another corporation.
For a list of cases see 3 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 856.
9. Davis v. Pearce, 30 F. (2d) 85, 89 (C. C. A. 8h, 1928); Carper v. Frost Oil Co, 72
Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922); Pioneer Oil and Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151
So. 161 (1933); Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 467, 8 S. W. 545
(1888); Hannerty v. Standard Theater Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S. W. 82 (1892). In Jasper
v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky 68, 153 S. W. 50 (1913) the fact that the corporation was
practically insolvent was determinative.
A similar rule has been applied in joint adventures. Harris v. Umsted, 79 Ark. 499, 96
S. W. 146 (1906); Commercial Bank v. Weldon, 148 Cal. 601, 84 Pac. 171 (1906).
10. 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 930; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 388.
11. In a case involving the sale by a receiver who arranged to purchase the property,
the court held the receiver liable for profits even though the estate might not have been
injured thereby. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586 (1921). For a discussion of the
fiduciary relationship in various types of situations see Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503
(U. S. 1846); Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106 (1914); Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620
(C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926).
12. Wing v. Dillinghan, 239 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); Garber v. Town, 208 Mich.
1, 175 N. W. 487 (1919); Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475 (1885); Munson v. Syracuse G.
& C. Ry. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355 (1886); cf. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586
(1921) ; see BALLATI NE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 376 et seq.; (1928) 12 IvtrNNu. L. REv, 536.
Note particularly the view of the Supreme Court in Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254
U. S. 590, 599 (1921). For a discussion in regard to rescission and the right to claim direc-
tors' profits see New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N. Y. 209, 155 N. B.
102 (1926).
13. Their dealings with the corporation may not be profitable. G. C. & Rr. Co. v.
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the right to purchase property which it was their duty to acquire for the corpor-
ation,' 4 or to use their relationship with the corporation for personal benefit.'8 The
power enjoyed by directors, it is thought, requires a peculiarly high standard of
business ethics, and the possibility or even appearance of fraud should be precluded.10
Only a rigid and not easily evaded standard of conduct which empowers stockholders
to avoid corporate liability, or compels directors to disgorge their profits, is con-
sidered adequate to discourage unfair practices.
The latter view was adopted in a recent decision which involved the right of
directors to utilize corporate opportunities for their own advantage.' 7 In 1927,
Acoustic Incorporated, an organization formed to manufacture and market radios,
found itself unable to commence production because it could not acquire a license
under existing patents.' s The only method apparently available for obtaining manu-
facturing privileges was to secure control of the insolvent De Forest Corporation,
which owned a non-transferable license. A finance company which had obtained
a prior agreement for the purchase of De Forest offered to sell one-third of the
stock of the reorganized De Forest Company. But the president of Acoustic, who
had been instructed by the directors to negotiate a loan with which to finance the
purchase, reported to the board that the corporation was unable to accept the offer
because of impaired credit.' 9 He announced however, that several directors had
offered to accept the option given Acoustic, and that the corporation would benefit
by being allowed four of the nine directors on the board of De Forest, as the terms
of the option provided.20 This offer was agreed upon and the option accepted in
the name of Acoustic on behalf of the specially formed syndicate, which subsequently
earned sizeable profits through resale of the stock. Accoustic afterwards bzcame
bankrupt, and the trustees sued to recover the profits realized by the directors on the
theory that the money was held by them in trust for the benefit of stockholders.
The Federal District Court, finding that there was no intent to defraud, and that the
plaintiff corporation was unable to secure the necessary funds because of impending
Kelly, 77 Il. 426 (1875). For further citations see 3 FLLrcam, op. cit. supra note 5, S 950;
note 12, supra.
14. Beaudette v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, 165 N. E. 671 (1929); Blake v. Buffalo Creek
Rr. Co., 56 N. Y. 485 (1874); Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 15S S. E. 673
(1931).
15. See Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 Fed. 93 (D. Del. 1917) ; Farwell v. Pyle National Electric
Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124 N. E. 449 (1919); Pike's Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich.
412, 123 N. W. 19 (1909); Mleinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1923)
(joint adventure).
16. G. C. & S. Rr. Co. v. Kelly, 77 Ill. 426, 435 (1875); Farvell v. Pyle-National Elec-
tric Headlight Co. 289 Ell. 157, 124 N. E. 449 (1919) ; Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. A.39, 154
N. E. 303 (1926) (agency).
17. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), rev'g 2 F. Supp.
971 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
18. The corporation's poor financial condition made it unable to meet the demands of the
Radio Corporation of America, which owns many essential patents.
19. The lower court noted that the corporation was losing money continually, and that
its bankers had refused to finance the venture. The president did mahe attempts to acquire
funds. The Circuit Court of Appeals accepted thee findings, but expressed some doubt
as to their conclusiveness.'
20. Acoustic was originally interested only in acquiring control so that the do2e rela-
tionship would make possible the manufacture of radios. It was not particularly in-
terested in the possibility of profits through the sale of De Forest stock.
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insolvency, followed the flexible view in regard to directors' liability and held for
the defendant. But the decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.-"
The corporation's apparent lack of capital was not considered sufficient to justify the
directors' exercise of the option, since a contrary ruling might diminish the diligence
of directors in seeking funds for the corporation. The court suggested that if it
were thought the assets could not be procured, negotiations should not have been
begun; since they had been, only the corporation might profit thereby. In thus
accepting the rigorous view the Court quoted with approval the opinion of Justice
Cardozo that "uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the disintegrating erosion
of particular exceptions." 22
In the opinion of some commentators the trend of recent decisions is in the
direction of the less rigorous view.23 Although this policy is thought to be more
liberal and more appreciative of modem business requirements, the social desirability
of the increased management discretion which it sanctions has not been demonstrated
and is not without doubt. Recent disclosures concerning particular corporate organi-
zations 24 perhaps necessitate exacting judicial regulation and justify the opinion of
the court in the present instance, which, although limited to a particular situation,
strengthens the contrary position and may forecast a shift in the judgment of other
courts.
AvAILABILITY TO CiEDITOR op DEBTOR'S TORT CAUSE or ACTIoN
AGAINST THIRD PARTY
A MASSACHUSETTS statute' provides that creditors may reach and apply to the
satisfaction of their debts property of their debtors which cannot be attached and
taken by execution at law, if the value of such property is ascertainable by sale,
appraisal, or other means within the ordinary procedure of the court. Proceeding
under this statute, a foreign corporation, a simple contract creditor, 2 sought to apply
to the satisfaction of a debt, the amount of which was admitted by both parties, a
tort cause of action which the debtor was then prosecuting against a third party for
inducing breach of a building contract. Pending determination of the creditor's suit,
21. One of the directors had been subsequently released by the board from all debts to
the corporation for an adequate consideration. But the ignorance of the new directors con.
cerning the present transaction made it ineffectual. Mass v. Lonstorf, 194 Fed. 577 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1912); Hawker v. Worley, 33 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). This rule applies
only in a fiduciary relationship. Houston v. Trower, 297 Fed. 558 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
The court also rendered judgment against the other members of the syndicate who were not
stockholders of the corporation, but who knew the fiduciary relationship of their associates.
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586 (1921); Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal &
Iron Co., 16 Md. 456 (1860); Emery v. Parrott, 107 Mass. 95 (1871).
22. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928).
23. BALLANTINz op. cit. supra note 7, at 384 et seq.; Note (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Rtv.
598.
24. See RPPLEY, MAIN STRE AND WALL STREET (1927); notes 1 and 2, supra.
1. MAss. GmT. LAws (1932) c. 214, § 3 (7).
2. The instant statute has been construed to permit simple contract creditors to come
within its provisions. H. G. Kilbourne Co. v. Standard Stamp Affixer Co., 216 Mass. 118,
120, 103 N. E. 469, 471 (1913).
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the debtor's tort action was reduced to a judgment in excess of the creditor's clim.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed a decree directing the application of this
judgment to the creditor's claim, holding that although at the filing of the plaintiff's
original bill the tort action had not yet been reduced to judgment, its value was
sufficiently certain to fall within the purview of the statute, since the particular tort
cause of action involved was based on an injury to specific property rights.3
Whether a chose in action, either in tort or contract, is subject to creditor's attach-
ment is generally made to depend on the fact of its assignability; for if it can be
prosecuted by none but its original owner, and cannot, therefore, be assigned even
by voluntary surrender, an involuntary deprivation through proceedings by creditors
will not be effectual in giving to the attaching party the rights of its former holder.
In determining whether or not a particular cause of action is subject to assignment
and consequently to creditor's levy, the courts have generally located it either in
the category of a claim for entirely uncertain damages, such as an action for assault,
or in that class of action for a wholly certain sum, such as exists in a suit on a con-
tract to pay a definite sum at a fixed time.4 The latter is subject to appropriation;
the former exempt. Although the historically hostile attitude of the courts toward
assignability of all choses in action has been modified in this respect. ex delicto ac-
tions for injury to the person, in all but a few jurisdictions,6 remain under the same
ban as attended early attempts at their alienation. 7 And even though survival
statutes in some jurisdictions transfer the right of action for personal torts to the
administrators and personal representatives of the wronged decedents,8 the tort
actions remain unassignable during the life time of the deceased despite the statu-
tory attribute of survivability thus created.0  Moreover, although statutory provi-
sions, contrary to the common law rule,10 have extended the application of the usual
3. Bethlehem Fabricators Inc. v. H. D. Watts Co., 190 N. E. 828 (blaMs. 1934).
4. Cf. McKendall v. Patullo, 52 R. I. 258, 260, 160 AUt. 202, 204 (1932).
5. See Glenn, The Assignment of Chases in Action; Rights of Bona Fide Pwrd:aser
(1934) 20 VA. L. Rxv. 621, collecting the literature on the subject at n.1
6. Iowa and Texas are jurisdictions in which all tort actions are 4agnable, because of
court interpretation of existing assignment and survival statutes. Kithcart v. Kithcart, 145
Iowa 549, 124 N. W. 305 (1910); McCloskey v. San Antonio Traction Co., 192 S. W. 1116
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
7. White Sewing Machine Co. v. Morrison, 232 Mass. 387, 122 N. E. 291 (1919)
(personal injury); Titcomb v. Bay State Grocery Co., 254 Mass. 399, 150 N. E. 874 (1926)
(malicious abuse of process); Tomkevich v. Mistevich, 222 Mich. 425, 192 N. W. 639
(1923) (malicious prosecution); Hunt v, Conrad, 47 Minn. 557, 50 N. W. 614 (1591)
(false imprisonment); Assets Collecting Co. v. Myers, 167 App. Div. 133, 152 N. Y. Supp.
930 (1st Dep't, 1915) (malicious prosecution); Howard v. Ward, 31 S. D. 114, 139 N. W.
771 (1913) (criminal conversation).
8. Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N. W. 830 (1914). For a comp!ete
collection of survival statutes see Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival
of Tort Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators (1931) 29 M.cH. L. Rmr.
969. The right transferred to the executor is the same one as would have been prosecuted
by the decedent had he lived, and not a new cause of action as is the case in wrongful
death statutes. Benson, Abatement and Survival of Actions for Fraud (1917) 2 V,%. L.
Rw. 2 (N. S.) 659.
9. Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 EL 571, 162 N. E. 170 (1928).
10. In the absence of statute, execution cannot be levied on a chose in action. Newbarry
v. Davison Chemical Co., 65 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); In re Stamford Con-
struction Co., 5 F. Supp. 650 (D. Conn. 1933); McIntosh Grocery Co. v. Newman, 184
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creditor's remedies of attachment and sale on execution in certain cases to choses in
action," in no instance have they encompassed the assignment of tort causes of ac-
tion for personal injury. Nor has the remedy of garnishment generally been
allowed where the asset sought by the creditor was of this nature,' 2 since the tort
feasor, garnishee, is said not to owe a "debt" subject to garnishment because of the
inchoate nature of his obligation.13 The basic reasons underlying this refusal of
the courts to grant tort choses, arising out of injury to the person, the attributes of
transferability, and hence appropriability, would seem to be that the outcome of the
pending or contemplated litigation is uncertain both as to the possibility of any
recovery whatsover, and, if granted, as to the amount of the judgment. Conse-
quently, it has been argued, an attempted appropriation by attachment and sale on
execution, if permitted, would result in possible injustice, since the property might
be sacrificed because of the uncertainty of its value; for if someone should be
permitted to purchase the cause of action at sale, he might eventually realize a sum
far in excess of the consideration paid at the sale. Since the purchaser's title to the
cause of action would be absolute, other creditors of the principal debtor would be
compelled to resort to bankruptcy proceedings, if available under the circumstances,
to set the sale aside, or else be precluded from access to the valuable asset as repre-
sented in the judgment on the tort action.14
To a great extent, however, these objections are absent in instances of ex delicto
causes of action in which the damages sought are for injuries to property, rather
than for damages to the person. This type of action has long been held survivable
and assignable, 15 for in the principal examples of replevin, 10 trover,17 trespass,18 and
ejectment,' 9 although unliquidated damages may figure in the ascertainment of re-
covery, the greater portion of the award is usually either the return of the detained
res or a sum based on the fairly certain value of the property as judged by pre-
vailing market rates; hence such actions are usually held assignable before judg-
N. C. 370, 114 S. E. 535 (1922). And what is subject to sale on execution is subject to
attachment. Davis v. Garrett, 25 N. C. 459 (1843); DRAxE, ATrACILMENT (7th ed. 1891)
§ 244.
11. CAL. CODE CIt. PROc. (Deering, 1931) § 688; IOWA CODE (1931) § 11672; LA. CODE
PRAc. (Dart, 1932) § 647; MONT. REv. CODE Aor. (Choate, 1921) § 9424; WAsn. RaV.
STAT. Awx. (Remington, 1932) § 518.
12. German v. Universal Ol Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 53 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Arp v.
Blake, 63 Cal. App. 362, 218 Pac. 773 (1923); Southern Ry. Co. v. Hodgson Bros. Co.,
148 Ga. 851, 98 S. E. 541 (1919); Waples-Platter Grocer Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 95
Tex. 486, 68 S. W. 265 (1902); DRAE, ATTAcH ENT (7th ed. 1891) § 548; 1 FREEMMA,
EXECUTiONS (3d ed. 1900) § 167.
13. Holcomb v. Town of Winchester, 52 Conn. 447 (1885) and cases cited supra note 12.
14. These reasons are suggested in International Coal Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania Rr.
Co., 152 Fed. 554, 556 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1907).
15. English statutes over a period of five hundred years have lessened the strictness
of the early common law rules of abatement. These modifications have been embraced by
practically all American jurisdictions. Stapp v. Madera Canal and Irrigation Co,, 34 Cal.
App. 41, 166 Pac. 823 (1917); Haight v. Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464 (1859); Birch v. Metropolitan
Elevated Ry. Co., 15 Daly 453, 8 N. Y. Supp. 325 (Com. Pleas. 1890); Buetman v.
Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co., 103 S. C. 512, 88 S. E. 279 (1916).
16. HmLuD, Raanis (2d ed. 1873) 98.
17. Id. at 590.
18. Id. at 589.
19. Id. at 218.
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ment.1' The same reasoning has prevailed in the decisions allowing the assignment
by the plaintiff of actions for fraudulent misrepresentation inducing worthless pur-
chases, since here also the measure of recovery would be the fairly certain sum
based on the difference in value between the objects actually purchased and those
fraudulently represented for sale.20 Recognizing the fact of ascertainability of
value in tort claims arising out of injury to property, the Bankruptcy Act provides
for their transfer to the trustee in bankruptcy,-" while causes of action for parsonal
injury have not been held to fall within such provision;2 2 and equitable creditor's
bills, authorized by statute to reach the former type of asset, frequently exist in
jurisdictions denying to the cause of action the application of the remedies of
execution and garnishment.P In allowing application to the creditor's claim of the
action for interference with a contract, the MLassachusetts court in the instant case
follows this general reasoning. The measure of damages in such an action as was
here involved is restricted to the precise value of the performance which the vonged
contracting party would have received in the absence of interference, and hence is
practically devoid of conjectural losses or profits. 2 4
Since in the present case the debtor's cause of action had actually been reduced
to judgment at the time the creditor secured a recovery under the statutory pro-
cedure,-2 little difficulty was presented in directing a disposition of the cause of
action. A more perplexing situation would arise if the action had still been pending
at the time the decree was entered on the creditor's bilL Although apparently there
are no decisions, and slight statutory authority,2 0 indicating who is to administer the
20. Jackson v. Deauvile Holding Co., 219 Cal. 493, 27 P. (2d) 643 (1933), noted in
(1934) 22 CATiF. L. Rv. 456 and (1934) 18 3IfizNN. L. Ry. 535; Keeler v. Dunham, 114
App. Div. 94, 99 N. Y. Supp. 669 (1st Dep't, 1906). Contra: Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N. D.
214, 229 N. W. 282 (1930), noted in (1931) 3 D.%n. L. REv. 265.
21. BA- nRurcy AcT § 70 (a), 32 STAT. 800 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (a) (6)
(1927). In re Gay, 182 Fed. 260 (D. Mass. 1910); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N. E.
170 (1928); Connolly v. National Surety Co., 35 Ohio App. 76, 171 N. E. 870 (1929);
see Notes (1911) 24 Hev. L. REv. 396 and (1920) 33 Hav. L. mrv. 860.
22. Irion v. Knapp, 132 La. 60, 60 So. 719 (1913); Note (1925) 39 Htnv. L. Rav. 263.
23. Delval v. Gagnon, 213 Mass. 203, 99 N. E. 1095 (1912); German National Banh v.
First National Bank, 55 Neb. 86, 75 N. W. 531 (1S98); Hudson v. Plets, 11 Paige 1E0
(N. Y. Ch. 1844) ; City of Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N. E. 197 (1392). 'The
fact that a verdict has already been rendered does not affect the quetion of a-ignability.
Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 600, 51 N. E. 183 (1898). But if judgment has been
rendered on the tort action an assignable property interest has been created, the transfer
of which does not depend on any extraordinary statutory remedy. Orange Hardware Co.
v. Ryan, 272 Mass. 413, 172 N. E. 654 (1930).
24. H. D. Watts Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 260 Mass. 599, 157 N. E. 634
(1927).
25. Bethlehem Fabricators Inc. v. H. D. Watts Co., 190 N. E. 823, 830 (Mass. 1934).
26. LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 2148-2152 provide that the control of the litiFation
shall remain in the attached debtor who shall be forbidden from settling or compromising
the suit. In the event of judgment for the debtor the proceeds shall frst go to the
satisfaction of the creditor's claim. In the absence of statute, the courts seem not to have
faced this issue squarely, since, as was true in the instant case, there is usually no ned
for actually allotting control to one party or the other at the time of the decree on the
creditor's bill. In Lord v. Harte, 118 Mass. 271 (1S75) the problem may have arize-n at
a different time in the proceedings, but the court was merely passing on a demurrer and
hence was under no necessity to decree control. In Delal v. Gagnon, 213 Mar. 203, 99
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pending tort action after it has been appropriated by the creditor, the three alterna-
tives which suggest themselves do not seem to militate against the wisdom of such
an appropriation by affecting adversely the interests of the parties concerned. For
if the debtor is permitted to continue the suit himself, the possibility of winning a
verdict for a sum greater than the debt should stimulate him to an honest conduct
of the trial, as should the prospect of a recovery equal to the sum of the debt, since
in such an event he would at least satisfy the claim. Were the creditor allowed to
press the suit, the hazard to the debtor, who might be deprived of the benefit of a
surplus judgment, through a possible settlement between the assignee. and the tort
feasor for the amount of the debt, might well be avoided through diligent inter-
ference by the wronged debtor. Or, following what appears to be the more
advisable procedure, a receiver might be appointed by the court where the debt sued
for is a substantial amount, to continue the litigation and distribute the proceeds.27
In any event, it seems that the only plausible way of viewing the transfer is that
it is an assignment of so much of the cause of action as will fully repay the creditor.
And no injustice would be done the tort feasor by the change in party plaintiff since
any counter claims available against the assignor remain despite the transfer.2 8
PROTECTION OF NON-PARTICIPATING STOCKHOLDERS IN REPRESENTATIVE SUITS
COGNIZANT of the danger to stockholders when their directors may be reluctant
to pursue litigation in the corporation's behalf, courts of equity have consistently
allowed representative suits to be brought by shareholders1 as derivative actions
for the corporation's benefit. 2 Final judgment in such a suit is considered as a
binding adjudication upon the rights of the corporation and its members8 in the
N. E. 1095 (1912), upon which the instant decision principally relies, the court merely
mentions by way of dictum that tort causes of action for damage to property may be
assigned but does not explain the procedure attending such assignment under the Massa-
chusetts statute.
27. Expense of providing receiver's fees might be a deterrent to the adoption of this
procedure where the debt sued for was of negligible amount.
28. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 21 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Powell Paving and Construction Co., 139 S. C,
411, 138 S. E. 184 (1927).
1. Jones v. Johnson, 10 Bush 649 (Ky. 1874); Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust
Co., 181 N. Y. 121, 73 N. E. 562 (1905); 3 CooK, CoRPORArzoNs (8th ed. 1923) § 701;
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1095; Glenn, The Stockholders, Sult-.
Corporate and Individual Grievances, 33 YALE L. J. 580 (1924).
2. The wrong done is viewed as having been directed solely against the corporation.
Converse v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 209 Mass. 539, 95 N. E. 929 (1911); Alexander
v. Donahoe, 143 N. Y. 203, 38 N. E. 263 (1894); Smith v. Bramwell, 146 Ore. 611, 31
P, (2d) 647 (1934); Hearst v. Putnam Mining Co., 28 Utah 184, 77 Pac. 753 (1904);
Glenn, supra note 1. The remedy, consequently, belongs to the organization and not
to the individual representative shareholder. Landis v. Sea Isle City Hotel Co., 53 N. J.
Eq. 654, 33 At. 964 (Ch. 1896); 3 Coox, CoaPoPAioNs (8th ed. 1923) § 701. Before the
representative may bring suit for the corporation, he must exhaust all available intra-cor.
porate remedies. Dannmeyer v. Coleman, 11 Fed. 97 (C. C. Cal. 1882); Kessler v. Ensley
Co., 123 Fed. 546 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1903).
3. Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Railways and Union Stockyards Co., 50 N. 3.
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absence of fraud or other bases for collateral attack. But this machinery, designed
to evade the tyranny of majority rule and to counteract officers' legerdemain, reveals
fertile opportunity for injury to stockholders. Faced with the inviting prospect of
remuneration from the corporate treasury for services rendered in carrying on the
suit, and .perhaps prompted by an attorney whose contingent fee depends on
victory,4 the representative may lose sight of the nature of his cause and treat it as
an individual grievance without considering the rights of the class for whom he
appears. Seduction of this sort may lead to his agreeing to a settlement, which,
through the operation of the doctrine of res adjudicata, may preclude further action
on the same cause by other shareholders who are unaware of the instigation of the
suit. On the other hand, the defendant directors may offer a substantial sum in
settlement when, as is most usual, they are confronted with a bona fide claini by
stockholders and wish to rid themselves of the burden of protracted litigation and
avoid the possibility of an excessive verdict being rendered against them. Or sub-
ject, perhaps, to a "strike" suit,5 they may seek to protect themselves from subse-
quent annoyance of this sort by concluding a settlement in open court. To them,
also, it is therefore a critical question whether the decree entered according to the
stipulation will be the end of the controversy, or whether successive groups of stock-
holders will be permitted to harass them on the ground that no conclusive deter-
rination was obtained nor adequate hearing granted before the settlement was
entered. The issues thus raised are suggested by a case recently before the lower
New York courts, and now pending in the New York Court of Appeals. 6
Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 277 (1892) (fact that representatives were not the same in both suits did
not bar the application of res adjudicata) ; Alexander v. Donahoe, 143 N. Y. 203, 33 N. E.
263 (1894); Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) (final adjudication of a
separate stockholder's suit even though commenced after the instant suit held a bar);
Grant v. Greene Consolidated Copper Co., 169 App. Div. 206, 154 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st
Dep't, 1915), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 655, 119 N. E. 1046 (1918); 1 FRn'4.smA-, Juarm rs (6th ed.
1952) §§ 435, 512, 513, 515. Stockholders are bound on two grounds. Since they are
members of the class being represented, the finding is res adjudicata for all those who
have benefited by the "virtual representation" afforded by the nominal plaintiff. In re
Dayton Coal and Iron Co., 291 Fed. 390 (E. D. Tenn. 1922). And the rights of the
corporation being settled, their purely derivative rights are adjudicated. Haw'kins v.
Glenn, 131 U. S. 319 (1889).
4. HARVEy, RiGHTs op Mnfalmn Srocxnonmm (2d ed. 1929) 50. Instances of stimuli
to which the representative litigant might be subjected include splitting of attorney's fee1
or offer of directorship by defendants who may control the majority of the voting steck.
5. See Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1308.
6. In the instant case suit was brought in 1930 by a stockholder in representative
capacity. At trial two years later, following a month's presentation of the plaintiffs cas2,
defendant corporate directors submitted an offer of settlement. A stockholders' meeting
was held according to New York Civil Practice Rule 8 to consider the offer in ope.
court and ratification was secured. Decision and final judgment were entered on the
stipulation of the parties and the money deposited in escrow. Two months later, in
January, 1933, the present plaintiff, who had not voted at the ratification meeting but who,
according to the briefs, had received notice of the meeting, instituted suit in representative
capacity on the same cause of action against the same defendants who successfully moved
to dismiss on the grounds of res adjudicata. Appeal was taken to the Appellate Division
where the judgment was upheld in a memorandum decision. Gerith Realty Corporation v.
Normandie National Securities Corporation, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't, 1934).
Appeal is now pending before the highest tribunal of the state.
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Although apart from representative suits, a settlement coupled with a judgment
entered according to the agreement of the litigants has in the absence of fraud and
collusion 7 the same effect as has a decree based on the findings of a regular trial,8
some doubt as to the binding nature of such an adjudication is present when there
is an attempt to compromise representative claims in this manner.9 In a bond-
holder's foreclosure suit instituted by a trustee, it has been held that the decree of
settlement was final, but a curt warning of the vitiating effect upon the binding
nature of the judgment of sharp practice by a representative in procuring a decree
was included in the opinion.10 And in taxpayers' actions the courts have denied
the application of res adjudicata and full faith and credit to settlements entered by
a representative acting beyond the scope of his authority. 1' The basic consideration
behind these holdings seems to be that a voluntary settlement entered without the
authorization of all interested parties falls outside the definition of a consent decree 12
and hence cannot be binding.
It seems logical that this reasoning should be applied to representative suits where
the stockholder is denied a fair opportunity to be heard in the settlement negotiations,
This involves, however, difficult and expensive subsequent litigation to reopen the
case or to attack it collaterally in another jurisdiction. At present, little protection
is granted non-participating shareholders before judgment has been entered on the
settlement. Inadequate notice is afforded shareholders both of the instigation of
the suit and of the proposed settlement. For, when the representative plaintiff files
his bill at the beginning of the case, he is under no legal obligation to inform other
similarly situated shareholders of his action, and consequently their power to
intervene and share the control and expense of the litigation is at best formal.
Moreover, even were they to learn of the suit, the expense of actual participation
might serve to deter their appearance. Similarly, when a settlement is proposed,
7. Even where fraud and collusion is discovered, laches may bar the complainant who
has already consented after due investigation. Adler v. Van Kirk Land and Construction
Co., 141 Ala. 551, 21 So. 490 (1897).
8. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317 (1905); Utah Power and Light Co, v. United
States, 42 F. (2d) 304 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Lodge v. Williams, 195 Ky. 773, 243 S, W. 1011
(1922); Berry v. Somerset Ry., 89 Me. 552, 36 Atl. 904 (1897); Interior Securities Co.
v. Campbell, 55 Mont. 459, 178, Pac. 582 (1919); Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105
S. E. 25 (1920); Manley v. Johnson, 85 Vt. 262, 81 Atl. 919 (1911); 3 FrnnN,
JUDGMENTS § 1350. Contra: Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Janesville Cotton Mills, 138
U. S. 552 (1891); Carr v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., 180 Ala. 159, 60 So. 277 (1912)
(denies application of res adjudicata to a consent judgment since there has been no
contest between the parties).
9. Insofar as a general rule can be gleaned from sparse precedent on this point, It may
be said that where adequate hearing has been granted in a representative suit the settlement
is declared res adjudicata. Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E.
161 (1887) (ratification of consent entered into by town authorities); 3 FREr n=,
JUDoMENrs § 1350. Indeed the principal case would seem to fall into the category of
the general rule since adequate notice seems to have been granted the represented stock-
holders by the court according to the New York statute. See infra note 15.
10. Campbell v. Rr. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 2,366 at 1182 (C. C. E. D. Tex. 1871).
11. Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139 (1888); Union Bank of Richmond v. Commissioners
of Oxford, 119 N. C. 214, 25 S. E. 966 (1896) (since town authorities had no power to
create a debt, their subsequent consent to its payment in a suit by the creditors was
invalid).
12. 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1352.
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the power of shareholders to intervene as active parties at this stage"a and thus to
control the terms of the settlement is nullified by a similar lack of sufficient notice.
If the information proceeds from the defendant officers through regular corporate
channels, initially it might seem to possess practical value; for since agreeing to a
settlement of this nature would seem to be beyond the apparent scope of a director's
authority, it would be necessary for the officers in seeking proxies with which to
ratify the settlement, to apprise shareholders of the purpose for which they seeh
their supporL However, since the notice emanates from those defendants who are
most anxious to effect the settlement and thus to rid themselves of a harassing law
suit, its tenor would undoubtedly be designed to discourage rather than to stimulate
active participation. If notice of the compromise proceedings issues from the court, 14
it is primarily intended to achieve ratification of the drectors' conduct in entering
into the settlement agreement rather than to invite actual participation as a party,
since the court is interested merely in conforming to the legal requirements of a
consent judgment 15 and not in prolonging the suit by adding new parties to the
controversy. In addition, were the notice to proceed from the court, by the pre-
vailing practice the court under stress of other pressing business would merely sign
a draft of notice prepared by the attorneys of the defendant directors whose object
would be to lull the recipient into false security. Furthermore, the recipient of such
notice would still be discouraged from joining by the burden of sharing the costs of
the suit. And finally, before judgment is entered on the compromise, the stock-
holders' opportunity to thwart collusive action by the nominal parties to the con-
troversy at the regular corporation meeting of ratification is equally valueless; for
any ambitious shareholder who, stimulated perhaps by the call for ratification either
from the corporation or the court, appeared to voice his protest, would be submerged
under the proxies wielded by the defendant directors.
A more desirable solution presents itself in the established power of courts of
equity'16 whose ministrations would serve to remove the settlement with all its
13. Collusive settlements reached by representative plaintiffs have been diregarded
where other stockholders have intervened meanwhile. The latter have been granted
control of the litigation while the original plaintiffs have withdrawn, their agreement not
concluding the suit. Snyder v. De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co., 154 Fed. 142 (C. C.
Me. 1907); McAlpin v. Universal Tobacco Co., 57 At. 418 (N. J. Ch. 19D4). In New
York other stockholders may institute similar representative actions up to the point of
interlocutory decree in the first action. But having failed to do so, their remedy is
restricted solely to the judgment in the original case. Kerr v. Blodgett, 48 N. Y. 62 (1871).
Hence if the settlement be proposed after the interlocutory decree, notice of the negotiation
would be worthless in effectuating active participation by recipients.
14. The New York statute requiring such notice reads: "where an action is brought
... for the benefit of any person other than the plaintiff who will come in and contribute
to the e.xpense of the action, notice requiring the creditors or others interested to exhibit
their demands or become parties shall be given or published as the court may order."
N. Y. CIVM PRACTICE RULE 8.
15. See note 12, supra. In the principal case so far as may be gleaned from the briefs,
adequate notice was served on all shareholders, many of whom appeared at the ratification
meeting in open court. See note 6, supra.
16. Cases have explicitly stated as the court's duty before entering a judgment b=r.ed
on the stipulation of the parties that due regard be taken to protect minority stockholders,
third persons, and sometimes the general public. Bernbeim v. Wallace, 186 Ky. 459, 47?.
217 S. W. 916, 921 (1920); State ex. rel. City of Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 105 Wis. 226, 233,
82 N. W. 158, 161 (1900).
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ramifications from the shadowy confines of intra-corporate maneuvering and place
it beneath the aegis of a faithful investigation of an officer of the court itself. In the
event of a proposed settlement,17 an impartial receiver could be appointed to
administer the cause of action, which is in the nature of a corporate asset, to provide
notice' 8 to all members of the represented class, hear all objections filed within a
reasonable time,' 9 decide whether or not to modify the terms of the settlement to
meet them, and finally submit the settlement to the court for confirmation. His
activities, founded on the notion that it is more beneficial to the individual stock-
holder to co-operate in these proceedings than to undergo the inconvenience and
expense of active intervention, would more than reinforce the mythical self-governing
corporate machinery of ratification.20 Any shareholder who ignored the opportunities
granted to him by this agency would justifiably be barred for his laches were he to
attempt further litigation on the same cause of action in the same state. An attack
made in a foreign jurisdiction questioning the judicial character and hence the
binding nature of these proceedings would fall before the fact that the findings of
the receiver were entered according to the stipulation of the parties and thus became
res adjudicata and entitled to full faith and credit. Carefully planned machinery
of this nature would protect both stockholders and defendant directors against the
patent opportunities for injustice now existing in the present administration of
stockholders' representative suits.
FAILURE TO PERMIT PROMPT CONCLUSION OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AS GROUND
FOR ENJOINING SUIT FOR DEFICIENCY.
RELAXATION of the operation of established rules with respect to the enforcement
of mortgage obligations, in order to protect the mortgage debtor from inordinately
large deficiency judgments, was not unknown to courts of equity before the present
depression. This liberality was exercised chiefly through the discretionary power
to refuse to confirm foreclosure sales.1 Frequently, only lip service was paid to the
17. Since the parties would be required to post a bond guaranteeing the payment of
the receiver's fee, his appointment at the beginning of all stockholder's representative suits,
although operating to discourage "strike" suitors, would be more likely to prevent an
impecunious plaintiff with a justifiable complaint from protecting his rights.
18. Cf. BANxRUPTCY AcT § 77 (b), (1934) 11 U. S. C. A. Supp, § 207, which provides,
inter alia, for listing of all stockholders and their addresses and for free recourse by all
interested parties to these lists. In addition notification by publication is required.
19. The difficulty with such a suggestion is the well-recognized hesitancy of the courts
to interfere with sanctioned intra-corporate machinery. How far the receiver might go
in limiting the power of the defendant directors who wield proxies and, perhaps, own a
majority of the voting stock, is beyond the scope of this note.
20. An alternative assurance of honest investigation could be provided by the formation
of an agency similar to the English Shareholders' Protection Association whose functions
include pressing litigation in behalf of stockholders in similar situations. Its ministrations
would serve to notify ignorant shareholders in the event of proposed settlement and to
represent them fully at the settlement negotiations. See The Stock Exchange-Protection
for Shareholders (1933) 117 EcoN. 499.
1. Roberts v. Goodin, 288 Ill. 561, 123 N. E. 559 (1919); Wyandotte State Bank v.
Murray, 84 Kan. 524, 114 Pac. 847 (1911); Koechl v. Gate Development Co., 149 App.
Div. 239, 133 N. Y. Supp. 763 (2nd Dep't, 1912), aff'd, 205 N. Y. 591, 98 N. E. 1106
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rule that inadequacy of price alone was insufficient to justify a denial of confirma-
tion,2 for the merest additional aggravating circumstance was considered to provide
a sufficient basis for that denial.3 Yet in each case where this was done there was
evidence that a resale would bring a higher bid. During the depression,4 with fore-
closure sales failing to realize even the depressed values of realty and the con-
sequential liability of mortgagors for deficiencies often little less than the amount
of the original indebtedness, this policy was sometimes extended to the complete
abrogation of the former rules. Thus, lately, confirmation has been withheld solely
(1912); Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Harkins, 312 Pa. 402, 167 At]. 273
(1933); Griswold v. Bardon, 146 Wis. 35, 130 N. W. 952 (1911); 1 WILTssm_ MoroAG=
FoaRncosuRE (4th ed. 1927) § 729. Confirmation will be withheld where there is evidence
of fraud, mistake, misapprehension, or misconduct. Slack v. Cooper, 219 Ill. 138, 76 N. E.
84 (1905); Kremer v. Rudolph, 105 Wis. 534, 81 N. W. 654 (1900); John Paul Lumber
Co. v. Neumeister, 106 Wis. 243, 82 N. W. 144 (1900); 3 Jo:.Es, Momn. mcms (Sth ed. 1923)
§ 2106.
2. Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180 (1886) and cases cited at 192; Hunter v. Highland
Land Co., 123 Md. 644, 91 AUt. 697 (1914); Guarantee Trust Co. v. Fitzgerald Hotel and
Development Corp., 97 N. J. Eq. 277, 127 At. 672 (1925); Mehan v. Blodgett, S6 Wis.
511, 57 N. W. 291 (1893); 3 JoNEs, MORTmAGrS (Sth ed. 1928) § 2108; 2 WxLsrEr_, Mo:r-
GAGS FoRFcLosunm (4th ed. 1927) § 752, citing numerous authorities. Many recent
cases too, have followed this general rule. Federal Land Bank v. Floyd, 187 Ark. 616,
61 S. W. (2d) 449 (1933); Federal Land Bank v. Vineyard, 187 Ark. 1063, 63 S. W.
(2d) 840 (1933); Kinnaird v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 249 Ky. 661, 61 S. W. (2d)
291 (1933); Kenly v. Huntingdon Building Association, 170 Atl. 526 (Md. 1934); Stallings
v. Annapolis Savings Institution, 172 Atl. 283 (Md. 1934); Judah v. Pitts, 333 Mo. 301,
62 S. W. (2d) 715 (1933); Hill v. Campbell, 125 Neb. 5S5, 251 N. W. 105 (1933);
Commerce Trust Co. v. Bradley, 125 Neb. 593, 251 N. W. 174 (1933). Contra: Ballentyne
v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285 (1907); State v. Campbell, 5 S. D. 636, 60 N. W. 32 (1894).
It was also generally said that scarcity of money and the existence of a financial de-
pression alone would not justify enjoining a foreclosure sale. 1 HiGr, I:j-ru.crxo:;s (4th
ed. 1905) § 454; and see Commonwealth Bank and Trust Co. v. MacDonell, 49 S. W.
(2d) 525 (Tem. Civ. App., 1932).
3. Seaman v. Riggins, 2 N. J. Eq. 214 (Ch., 1839) (junior mortgagee misdirected to
the place of sale); Howell v. Hester, 4 N. J. Eq. 266 (Ch., 1843) (junior mortgagees
agent mistook date of sale); Wetzler v. Schaumann, 24 N. J. Eq. 60 (Ch., 1873) (owner
of equity of redemption misinformed as to terms of sale); Rea's Executor v. Wheeler,
27 N. J. Eq. 292 (Ch., 1876) (counsel for mortgagee too ill to attend sale); Banta v.
Brown, 32 N. J. Eq. 41 (Ch., 1880) (misunderstanding between solicitors of parties as
to sale); Workingmen's Mutual Building Loan Acsociation v. McGillick, 28 Afl. 46S
(N. J. Ch., 1894) (prospective bidder, after attending twelve prior adjournment-, arrived
at place of sale ten minutes after bidding was cosed); New Jersey National Bank v.
Savemore Realty Company, 107 N. 3. Eq. 478, 153 Aft. 480 (1931) (prospective bidder,
forced to wait fifteen minutes for street car, reached place of sale five minutes late).
In accord: Means v. Rosevear, 42 Kan. 377, 22 Pac. 319 (1889); Lefever v. Kline, 294
Pa. 22, 143 At. 488 (1928); Adams v. Haskell, 10 Wis. 123 (1859); cf. Federal Title
and Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 At]. 538 (Ch., 1933).
4. See generally Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments During an Economic De-
pression (1934) 20 VA. L. R V. 771; Comment (1933) 47 HAmy. L. REV. 299; Comment
(1934) 47 Hsnv. L. Ray. 660; Comment (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. R,'. 261; Comment
(1933) 42 YAix L. 3. 1236; (1933) 33 CoL. L. R v. 744; (1933) 17 Mra.-. L. REv. 821;
(1933) 42 YALE L. 3. 960.
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because of inadequacy of pricer or made conditional upon the mortgagee's crediting
the fair market value or the potential value of the land on the bond.0 And even
if the sale had already been confirmed, equity has none the less been willing to
accord its benevolent protection.7
Illustrative of this development of the policy, but otherwise unprecedented, is
the recent New Jersey case of Briscoe v. O'Connor,8 where the Court of Chancery
enjoined a mortgagee from prosecuting his deficiency suit at law. Briscoe, com-
plainant in the present suit, bought an undeveloped lot in 1927, giving a bond and
mortgage for $11,000 as part of the purchase price. The mortgage, which was sub-
sequently assigned to the defendant O'Connor, contained a covenant in which the
mortgagee agreed to subordinate this mortgage to the lien of a new mortgage in a
sum not to exceed seventy-five percent of the cost of the land and building to be
erected upon the lot. Shortly after starting to build, Briscoe sold the property to
A, who conveyed it to B. The latter induced the Avon Building and Loan Asso-
ciation to finance the building, giving a $70,000 mortgage as security for the repay-
ment of the advances. B later conveyed to C. In 1928, when the purchase money
mortgage was due and in default, O'Connor instituted foreclosure proceedings. To
this action the Association interposed a counterclaim, praying for specific perform.
ance of the subordination covenant or, in the alternative, that the court decree
that its mortgage was a prior lien upon the property. O'Connor resisted the counter-
claim on the ground that he was released from the covenant since the new mortgage
exceeded seventy-five percent of the cost of the building and the land. The court,
however, refused to hold the covenant inoperative, interpreting it to mean that the
lien of the new mortgage should supersede the purchase money mortgage to the
extent of seventy-five percent of the cost, which was determined to be $64,500. But
it was not until 1933 that this decision was rendered.0 Thereafter, the property
having been sold at foreclosure sale to the counterclaimant for less than the amount of
its priority, O'Connor started an action on the bond for the deficiency. Briscoe
sought to enjoin this suit on the ground that O'Connor's refusal to subordinate at
once had precipitated the long litigation which, in turn, had caused the existence of a
deficiency; for, it was claimed, had not the sale been thus delayed, it would have
S. Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249 N. W. 844 (1933); and cases
cited infra note 6.
6. Federal Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166
AtI. 538 (Ch., 1933); Better Plan Building and Loan Association v. Holden, 114 N. J.
Eq. 537, 169 Atl. 289 (Ch., 1933); Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W.
556 (1933); Lurie v. J. J. Hockenjos Co., 113 N. J. Eq. 504, 167 At]. 766, aff'd 115 N. 3. Eq.
304, 170 At]. 593 (1934) (confirmation held to be conditional upon mortgagee's crediting
on bond the amount of highest bona fide offer made subsequent to sale) ; see Bank of Man-
hattan Trust Co. v. Elda Corporation, 147 Misc. 374, 383, 265 N. Y. Supp, 115, 124
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 168 S. C. 272, 281, 167
S. E. 465, 469 (1932).
7. Baader v. Mascellino, 113 N. J. Eq. 189, 166 Atl. 466 (Ch., 1933) (mortgagee
granted equitable aid in enforcing deficiency judgment but only upon the condition that
he credit on bond the profit he had realized on resale of mortgaged premises after buying
it at foreclosure sale); Chemical Bank and Trust Co. v. Adam Schumann Associates,
150 Misc. 221, 268 N. Y. Supp. 674 (Sup. Ct., 1934) (deficiency suit vacated and Set
aside where mortgagee-buyer had resold foreclosed land at price high enough to hav
satisfied whole original debt).
8. 115 N. 3. Eq. 360, 170 Atl. 884 (Ch., 1934).
9. O'Connor v. Arywitz, 112 N. J. Eq. 567, 165 At. 432 (Ch., 1933).
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taken place before the depression and during a prosperous period when enough would
have been realized to satisfy both mortgages. The Court of Chancery denied a
motion to dismiss the bill for want of equity and granted a preliminary injunction
pending final appeal. The defendant was held estopped by his breach of duty and
his stubborn resistance to the counterclaim from now asserting his right to a de-
ficiency judgment.
That O'Connor had thus committed a wrong and had thereby harmed Briscoa in
such a manner as to justify equity's imposing a penalty, strongly reminiscent of tort
liability, is open to question. It is not self-evident that his claim was so unreason-
able as to be called untenable. Whether the words of the covenant were meant
to delimit the extent of his duty to subordinate or whether they were descriptive
of the kind of mortgage to which alone the mortgagee had bound himself to sub-
ordinate was a matter requiring the interpretation of the intention of the contracting
parties.' 0 Since the terms were not so unambiguous as to foreclose controversy
and since it is not evident that there was a precedent which would have conclusively
indicated their construction, O'Connor's insistence upon a judicial interpretation
of their meaning hardly seems inequitable. This is, perhaps, made more apparent
by a decision rendered in another jurisdiction in a contemporary case where a result
approximating what O'Connor desired was reached.'1 Furthermore, the conclusion
that the responsibility for the delay was solely O'Connor's is not beyond doubt. In
such cases there frequently are priorities of numerous mechanics' liens to be de-
termined. And it is conceivable that difficulty would be encountered in tracing the
funds advanced for building purposes and in computing the cost of the building.
These time-consuming steps would have been necessary whether O'Connor were
merely seeking an adjudication of the extent of his liability under the covenant or
was attempting to escape liability entirely.' 2 That he would have been justified in
10. Compare, for example, the interpretation of contracts of suretyship where the
intention of the parties is said to be controlling as to whether the sum mentioned in
the contract is declaratory solely of the liability under the surety's guarantee or both
of that amount and of the total extent of the credit which may be advanced without
discharging the surety entirely. See Spixch, Sunr==sn (1913) § 101. For the latter
interpretation see e.g. Commercial National Bank of Washington v. London and Lancashire
Indemnity Co., 10 F. (2d) 641 (App. D. C. 1925); Brez v. Warner, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 226
(1880); Historical Publishing Co. v. La Vaque, 64 Minn. 282, 66 N. W. 1150 (1896);
Bloomington Mining Co. v. Searles, 63 N. J. L. 47, 42 AUt. 340 (Sup. Ct, 1899).
11. Glencoe State Bank v. Cole, 265 Ill. App. 158 (1932). In this case the purchns-
money mortgagee had agreed to subordinate his mortgage to a mortgage to be given the
maker of a $10,000 building loan. The loan was made, but only $3,000 was expanded
upon the building. In foreclosure proceedings, it was determined that the purchase money
mortgagee retained a first lien on the land and received a second lien on the building;
the building loan mortgagee was accorded a prior lien on the building and a second ien
on the land. Thus, the purchase money mortgagee was left in as good, if not better,
position than he had been in before the execution of the covenant. Cf. York M.fortgage
Corporation v. Clotar Construction Corp., 254 N. Y. 128, 172 N. E. 265 (1930) (covenant
to subordinate interpreted according to the intention of the parties in regard to the typ2
of mortgage to be accorded priority).
12. Under the UNioaR DzcrARATRy Junrmmms Ac', N. J. Commp. Sr,. (Supp.
1924) tit. 163, §§ 351-366, O'Connor might have petitioned the court for an adjudication
of his rights under the covenant to subordinate and of the priorities of the various lien
claimants. See, generally, Borchard and Morrison, Dedara!or, Judgments in New Jcrsey
(May, 1932) 1 Ah.mcRma BAsLEsry L. REv. 1; cf. McCullough v. Marsden Estate, 14 Alberta
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the former course was attested to by the decision in the foreclosure action itself,
for the court found that much of the money advanced had been diverted l a and that
the purchase money mortgage was subordinate to only a part of the building loan
mortgage. 14
But even if it be assumed that O'Connor's claim was untenable and his stubborn
allegiance to it the cause of the delay, it does not necessarily follow that he should
be made to bear the loss in the value of the property. A mortgagee whose mortgage
is in default is under no duty to foreclose at once,15 the rationalization being that
in such a situation it is the debtor's duty and not the creditor's to see that a debt
is paid.16 Only the statute of limitations, which operates upon his cause of action,
restrains him from waiting as long as he may desire.17 Thus, forebearance to fore-
close for an extended period has been held no defence to a foreclosure action or a
later suit for the deficiency even where more would have been realized had the
mortgagee foreclosed promptly.' 8 The courts have been induced to reach this con-
clusion by the fact that the mortgagor can eliminate delay at any time and prevent
subsequent loss by paying his debt.19 And since this circumstance is equally true
whether the procrastination occurs before foreclosure or during the litigation, little
reason appears to distinguish between the two situations. Had Briscoe paid the
debt when due and assumed O'Connor's rights under the mortgage by subrogation,-20
he could have subordinated at once, eliminating the delay and preventing any loss
to himself, for, according to his claim, a prompt sale, made possible by the with-
drawal of O'Connor's resistance, would have satisfied both liens.
The case does not seem to warrant the invocation of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. Although that doctrine is incapable of exact definition, there is little simi-
larity between these circumstances and those ordinarily said to give rise to an
estoppel. 2 ' O'Connor made no representation; his conduct in the foreclosure pro.
94 (1918); Dominion Iron and Steel Co. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce (1928) 1
D. L. R. (Nova Scotia) 809. The same causes of delay would have been present in such
an action; it is inconceivable that under such proceeding O'Connor could be subjected
to a penalty for the resultant delay.
13. O'Connor v. Arywitz, 112 N. J. Eq. 567, 570, 165 Atl. 432, 433 (Ch., 1933).
14. The moving papers and the record in the foreclosure proceeding disclose other
'factors contributing to the delay: C, the owner of the property at the time of fore-
closure, had absconded, necessitating service by publication; extrajudicial attempts at
settlement were made; court inertia had to be overcome; and the collateral activities of
the lawyers themselves consumed much of the time.
15. Lewis v. Blume, 226 Mass. 505, 116 N. E. 271 (1917); Wilson v. Stevens, 105
N. J. Eq. 377, 148 Atl. 392 (Ch., 1929); Oystermen's National Bank of Sayville v.
Edwards, 112 N. J. Eq. 148, 163 At. 445 (Ch., 1932); Monroe County Savings Bank
Baker, 147 Misc. 522, 264 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct., 1933).
16. Watertown Fire Insurance Co. v. Simmons, 131 Mass. 85 (1881); Welch v. Walshq,
177 Mass. 555, 59 N. E. 440 (1901); Landberg v. Equitable Investment Co., 292 Pa.
476, 141 AUt. 302 (1928); and cases cited supra note 15.
17. 1 WILsTM, MORTGAGE FoaxcLosuRE (4th ed. 1927) § 77.
18. City Institution for Savings v. Kelil, 262 Mass. 302, 159 N. E. 731 (1928); zee
Brick v. The Freehold National Banking Co., 37 N. J. L. 307, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1875); Mer-
chants' Insurance Company of New York v. Hinman, 34 Barb. 410, 418 (N. Y. 1861).
19. Cf. Brick v. The Freehold National Banking Company, 37 N. J. L. 307, 308 (Sup.
Ct. 1875).
20. See 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1123, and cases there cited; cf. Beach
v. Waite, 21 Cal. App. 304, 131 Pac. 880 (1913).
21. See 2 PoMRoy, EQurry JuRisPRUDxNcE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 804, 805; 3 Soay,
EQurry JuRisPRuDENcE (14th ed. 1918) § 1989.
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ceedings was not inconsistent with his present position; nor is it apparent that
Briscoe changed his position accordingly or allowed himself to be lulled into a feeling
of false security. 2 2 Briscoe, moreover, would seem hardly to be in a position to
assert an estoppel. His duty to pay the debt at the time of foreclosure was clearp
and it could, therefore, be said to be inequitable to allow him to take advantage of
a delay which he could have prevented by performing that duty. That Briscon,
relying upon O'Connor's claim as to his legal rights under the covenant, made no
attempt to protect himself from any loss which might result from delaying the fore-
closure sale, is no ground to spell out an estoppel. If O'Connor was chargeable with
knowledge of the true meaning of the covenant, then, Briscoe, one of the original
contracting parties should have been equally cognizant of it.2 In any event, the
assertion of an opinion as to one's legal rights has not generally been considered to
give rise to an estoppel.
2 5
Public policy, sympathetic though it has been to the plight of the foreclosed mort-
gagor during the depression, would scarcely seem to dictate the holding in the instant
case. When equity in recent months has come to the aid of the mortgage debtor
by refusing to confirm judicial sales unless the potential value of the property rather
than the actual sale price was deducted,2 0 it has been action of an essentially different
22. In fact Briscoe showed that he was fully aware of the effect of O'Connoes claim
upon his own position. In an unsuccessful attempt to be made a party to the action
on the counterclaim, he petitioned the court to be allowed to intervene, stating that the
value of the building and the land did not exceed the amount due on the building loan
mortgage and that, if that mortgage were given priority, he would be liable to O'Connor
for a deficiency equalling the greater part if not all of the purchase money mortgage.
This petition was sworn to September 30, 1929, and filed October 8, 1929, before the
depression. See Brief for Appellant, p. 6, citing affidavit. The moving papers further
indicate the possibility of a sub rosa participation by Briscoe in the action on the counter-
claim, resisting along side of O'Connor the enforcement of the subordination covenant. If
this fact were proven, it might well have been deemed a counter estoppel, asuming that
O'Connor's conduct constituted a primary estoppel. Cf. Nadel v. Peoples Bank, 66 Pa.
Super. Ct. 396 (1917); Utah State Building and Loan Association v. Per-ins, 53 Utah
474, 173 Pac. 950 (1918).
23. Briscoe's promise to pay his debt was in no sense conditional upon O'Connor's
subordinating the mortgage; and the breach of an "independent" covenant by one party
does not release the other from his promise. Coursen v. Canfield, 21 N. J. Eq. 92
(Ch., 1870); Duryee v. Linsheimer, 27 N. J. Eq. 366 (Ch., 1376); Frenche v. McConell,
38 At. 687 (N. J. 1897); 3 Joms, MfORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1903; 1 WiLrsm, Mo.ar-
OAOE Foancmosunn (4th ed. 1927) § 185.
24. See e.g. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 333 et seq. (1893).
25. Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294, 37 N. E. 1031 (1894), afg 49 Ill. App. 503
(1893); Wright v. Douglass, 10 Barb. 97 (N. Y. 1850), reversed on other ground ,
7 N. Y. 564 (1853); Estis v. Jackson, 111 N. C. 145, 16 S. E. 7 (1892); Gjerstadengn
v. Van Duzen, 7 N. D. 612, 76 N. W. 233 (1898).
26. See cases supra, note 6. A New Jersey statute (Lav.-s 1933, c. 82) decreeing that
the deficiency should be computed by subtracting the fair market value from the original
indebtedness was held unconstitutional in Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. J. L.
596, 169 AtI. 177 (1933). But what was not permitted to be done by legislative edict
has been accomplished by judicial decision. Federal Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co.
v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 At. 538 (Ch., 1933); Lurie v. J. J. Hockenjos




character.27 Before the depression, judicial sales were considered the fairest way of
determining the value of realty, and when the amount thus obtained had been de-
ducted from the original debt, the result represented a true deficiency.28 But the
current lack of competitive bidding and the unavailability of credit for refinancing
has made it impossible for the foreclosure sale to perform its function, Equity,
therefore, has provided a more efficient method of determining the true deficiency,
substituting a new remedy but leaving unchanged the mortgagee's rights. The in-
stant case, however, places upon the mortgagee the burden of the economic loss due
to a failure to accomplish foreclosure at the top of the business cycle. If delaying
the foreclosure proceeding creates this liability, it logically follows that a mortgagee
whose mortgage is in default must also foreclose at once or bear the risk of sub-
sequent diminution in value. This would appear paradoxical in the face of the
current policy of encouraging forbearance, or of even enforcing forbearance through
the agency of moratory legislation. In the light of both this latter policy and the
holding in the instant case, prophetic powers would be required in the mortgagee.
Were his mortgage to fall due at the top of the business cycle and only a downward
trend could be expected, he must foreclose at once. But were his mortgage to fall
due during a depression and recovery was presumably around the comer, he must
expect to be forced to forbear. Thus, when he advances money and takes a mortgage
as security, he is forced to guarantee the wisdom of the mortgagor's realty invest-
ment. Certainly, such a burden would do much to make mortgage financing an
excessively unattractive risk to lenders.29
The principal case is further unique in that it suggests an entirely new use of
equity jurisdiction. Usually, if a litigant delays proceedings, 0 pursues frivolous
claims,31 or is guilty of illegal practices,3 2 the court sitting on that case is empowered
27. For example, equity has refused to enjoin actions upon the mortgage bonds. Loma
Holding Corporation v. Cripple Bush Realty Corporation, 147 Misc. 655, 265 N. Y. Supp.
125 (Sup. Ct., 1933); cf. Lurie v. J. J. Hockenjos Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 304, 306, 170
At. 593, 594 (1934); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Jobar Realty Corp., 240 App.
Div. 869 (1st Dep't, 1933) (reversing order vacating deficiency judgment because of dis-
parity between sale price and intrinsic value).
28. Snyder v. Blair, 33 N. J. Eq. 208 (Ch., 1880); see 2 WIaLsia, MoRToao- Fo1-
crosuPE (4th ed. 1927) § 963.
29. The fear of making mortgage financing too unattractive by assisting the mortgagor
at the expense of the mortgagee has frequently been voiced by the courts, some courts
even hesitating to place conditions upon the confirmation of the foreclosure sales. United
Building and Loan Association v. Neuman, 113 N. J. Eq. 244, 166 Atl. 537 (Ch. 1933);
Mountain Ridge Building and Loan Association v. M. and W. Holding Co., 115 N. J.
Eq. 52, 169 Atl. 526 (Ch. 1933); Mellen v. Edwards, 37 Pa. (2d) 203 (Wash., 1934).
30. Baca v. Noyes-Norman Shoe Co., 18 Ariz. 386, 161 Pac. 884 (1916); Florence
Oil and Refining Co. v. First National Bank, 38 Col. 119, 88 Pac. 182 (1906); Florence
Oil and Refining Co. v. McRae, 40 Col. 303, 90 Pac. 507 (1907); Roe v. Roe, 7 Ga.
App. 142, 66 S. E. 482 (1909); Houston Transportation Co. v. Allien, 178 S. W. 1005
(Tex. Civ. App., 1915); cf. Commonwealth v. French, 130 Ky. 744, 114 S. W. 255 (1908).
In some states penalties are provided by statute, see e.g. hL. Rav. STAT. ANx. (Smith-
Hurd, 1933) c. 33, § 23; Mo. STAT. AwN. (Vernon, 1932) § 1064; N. Y. C. P. A.
(1920) § 1510(4).
31. Young v. Boles, 92 Ark. 242, 122 S. W. 496 (1909); McKelvey v. Wagy, 157
Cal. 406, 108 Pac. 268 (1910); Fox v. Campbell, 157 Cal. 605, 108 Pac. 680 (1910);
Goodwin v. Whittier, Coburn Co., 170 Cal. 305, 149 Pac. 583 (1915); Mayer Brothers
Co. v. Parenti, 176 Ill. App. 300 (1913). For statutory penalties, see e.g. CoNa. Gw.
STAT. (1930) § 5674; N. Y. C. P. A., (1920) § 1487.
32. Cf. Beer v. Orthaus, 128 App. Div. 920, 113 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1st Dep't, 1908).
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to penalize him by dismissal, or by striking out an improper pleading, or by assessing
costs to l~In. But the action by a court in a collateral proceeding, looking into the
record of a prior case and penalizing the litigant for the quality of his former con-
tentions, is apparently unprecedented. That a litigant should be punished for en-
gaging in inequitable tactics solely to exhaust the other party and defer the decision
cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, to distinguish between such tactics and plausible
though unsuccessful claims, which incidentally delay proceedings, is at best difficult,
as the instant case illustrates; and the efficacy of relegating this task to an inde-
pendent court is questionable. Granting the necessity of supervisory control over
the pleadings, it would appear that the court sitting on the case would be in a better
position to judge their genuineness as well as their merit and to take appropriate
action.
